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QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EFFICIENCY OF
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Matthew T. Bodie*
The growing popularity of arbitration agreements is welldocumented. The academic literature on these agreements has
been largely critical, arguing that they jeopardize important
rights and enable employers to take unfair advantage of employees
and consumers. However, standard economic analysis suggests
that since these agreements are freely negotiated, they presumably
increase the utility of both parties and are therefore efficient. This
Article raises questions about the efficiency of such agreements in
the employment context. It begins by modeling the decisionmaking process by which a rational employee would judge the
desirability of an agreement, both after and before a dispute has
arisen. The model demonstrates that no employee can, in reality,
have the information necessary to make a rational economic
judgment about a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. In the
absence of information, systematic behavioral heuristics will lead
employees to overlook or misjudge the costs and benefits of such
agreements.
Given that employees are not signing these
agreements on the basis of rational economic analysis, the Article
considers possible arguments that the agreements might still
increase societal efficiency.
Ultimately, it concludes that
proponents of pre-dispute agreements need to provide stronger
evidence of such efficiencies. In the meantime, courts, legislators,
and commentators should focus more on the decisionmaking
imperfections that can lead to inefficient arbitration agreements.

INTRODUCTION
These days it is hard to escape from arbitration agreements.
Arbitration is not new; Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
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(FAA)1 in 1925 to ensure that states would enforce arbitration
agreements.2 However, in the 1990s the use of arbitration in
consumer and employment contracts exploded.3 Such agreements
generally require that parties bring any common law or statutory
claims arising out of the relationship to arbitration, rather than
litigating such claims in court.
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,4 the Supreme Court
resolved any lingering questions about the per se enforceability of
arbitration agreements in the employment context. In the 1991 case
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc.,5 the Court had held that the
FAA required the enforcement of an arbitration agreement between a
securities analyst and his employer, even as to the analyst’s claim of
age discrimination.6 However, the arbitration agreement in that case
was in a securities registration application, and the Court had not
resolved whether the FAA applied to agreements set forth in
employment contracts.7 In Circuit City the Court held that the FAA
required enforcement of arbitration agreements between almost all
employers and employees, with the sole exception of employees

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
See id. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
3 See Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (2004)
(discussing the explosive growth of arbitration cases administered by such
arbitration groups as American Arbitration Association, National
Arbitration Forum, and Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.).
4 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
5 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
6 See id. at 26-27.
7 See id. at 25 n.2.
Section 1 of the FAA provides that “nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The court declined to address the scope of
the phrase “any other class of worker involved in foreign or interstate
commerce.”
1
2
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directly involved in interstate transportation.8 Perhaps ironically,
however, Circuit City did not end up prevailing in its own landmark
decision: the Ninth Circuit held on remand that the arbitration
agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable and
denied enforcement.9
The history of the Circuit City case highlights an important
shift in the discussion about employment arbitration agreements.
Initially following Gilmer, commentators criticized the premise that
employment arbitration agreements should be enforceable per se.10 A
flurry of articles in the mid-1990s attacked the Gilmer premise that
arbitration could ever provide relief for violations of federal statutory
rights, particularly anti-discrimination rights.11
However, the
Court’s analysis in Gilmer and Circuit City found that the FAA
requires the enforcement of almost all arbitration agreements. The
Court noted that the purpose of the FAA “was to place arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other contracts.”12 Since the

See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. The Court held that section 1 of the FAA
applied only to contracts of employment of transportation workers –
namely, “those workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce.” Id. at 112 (citation omitted). The purpose of this
exclusion is somewhat unclear; as the Court noted in Circuit City, the
legislative history of § 1 is “quite sparse.” Id. at 119.
9 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 2329 (2002).
10 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 453 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996).
11 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived”
and Lost in the Arbitral Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 384 (1996); Joseph R.
Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy
in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOF. LAB. L.J. 1, 52-53 (1996); Sharona Hoffman,
Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute
Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 131, 135 (1996); Stone, supra note
ST1, at 1020.
12 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
8
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parties had made an agreement to arbitrate, they “should be held to
it.”13
The contract paradigm that has been applied to arbitration
agreements does not require, however, that every such agreement
must be enforced. As the Court noted in Gilmer, an agreement to
arbitrate may be unenforceable if such agreement “resulted from the
sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide
grounds for the revocation of any contract.”14 Thus, state and federal
courts are grappling with common-law contract doctrines as applied
to particular employment arbitration agreements, with results such
as the ultimate one in Circuit City finding the agreement
unconscionable.15
The cornerstone presumption of contract law is that contracts
are entered into freely by individuals who expect the contract to
enhance their individual utility. Since rational actors would only
agree to a contract if they believe it will make them better off, society
can presume that each contract will enhance overall social welfare.16
If these presumptions did not hold true in the context of employment
arbitration agreements, then a central justification for their
enforcement would be inapplicable. We must therefore ask: why are
employees and employers making these agreements? Are these
agreements being formed because each side believes it will be better
off?
Using traditional law and economics models, influential
commentators have argued that this must be the case. Simply stated,
these scholars have found that arbitration agreements increase
overall efficiency by allowing the parties to choose a more efficient
method of dispute resolution.17 The purpose of this Article is to
13 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
14 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor, 473 U.S. at 627).
15 See Adams, 279 F.3d at 892; see also Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, 341 F.3d
256 (3d Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir.
2003); Brasington v. EMC Corp., 855 So.2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
16 See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, CONTRACT LAW 470 (6th ed. 2003).
17 See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 212-13 (2000); Steven Shavell,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8
(1995). For this paper, I will use the term efficient in its broadest form:
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question this conclusion. In examining the law and economics of
these agreements, I start by unpacking the considerations that go into
the making of the agreement itself. I hope to show how economically
rational employees and employers might go about making such
decisions by creating a model of this decisionmaking process. This
model sets forth the many factors that an employee would need to
know in order to make a rational economic decision about an
arbitration agreement.
The model also incorporates recent
developments in the field of behavioral law and economics
concerning systematic irrationalities that may influence the process.
By creating a picture of the actual decision to sign such agreements, I
endeavor to establish a new starting point for debates about the
wisdom of their enforceability.
Part I establishes the basic economic model for agreements to
arbitrate employment claims. I begin with a model for arbitration
agreements that are executed after the claim has arisen, also know as
post-dispute arbitration agreements. After developing this model, I
use it as the basis for the more complicated model for signing an
agreement at the beginning of the employment relationship – a predispute arbitration agreement. As the model will demonstrate, the
information necessary to determine the efficiency of a pre-dispute
agreement is likely to be unavailable to employees who contemplate
such agreements. Faced with this dilemma, employees may fall back
onto decisionmaking shortcuts, known as heuristics, which may lead
them to an inefficient result. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis that
employees can make about a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate is
more likely to be accurate, and thus more likely to produce an
efficient result, than the analysis that employees can make about a
pre-dispute agreement..
Part II therefore considers whether pre-dispute employment
arbitration agreements might still be efficient despite the
efficient shall mean the result that provides for the greatest overall social
utility. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-16 (6th ed.
2002). I differentiate general efficiency from Pareto efficiency in the usual
manner: an efficient result is one in which the parties are better off overall,
although an individual party may be worse off, whereas all parties are
better off when a result is Pareto efficient. See id. at 12-14 (comparing Pareto
superiority with the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency).
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informational deficiencies that underlie them. One possibility is that
pre-dispute agreements provide some additional benefit by locking
the parties in before the dispute has arisen. Another possibility is
that employees will irrationally refrain from entering arbitration
agreements after a dispute has arisen. One final possibility is that
pre-dispute agreements are more efficient because they reduce
externalities such as judicial administration costs. Part III then
endeavors to set forth some parameters for the next generation of
debate.

I. MODELING THE DECISION TO ARBITRATE
Free exchange is the cornerstone of capitalism. Exchange is
what allows individuals to maximize their utility: individuals can
specialize in producing one good or service but then acquire the
panoply of other necessities through purchase or trade. Freedom of
exchange through contract is the cornerstone of our commercial legal
regime. The general rule in contracts is that people are free to agree
to just about any type of exchange and have those agreements
enforced in a court of law. 18 The theory behind freedom of contract
is simple: parties will come to an agreement only if they believe that
it is in their best interests to do so. Given that both parties think the
agreement will improve their utility, people should be permitted to
make such agreements and have them enforced in the future.19 Of
course, some parties will change their mind about the costs and
benefits of the bargain as the agreement plays out. Markets may
18 Some exceptions to this general rule include contracts to commit a crime,
see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1978), surrogacy
contracts, see Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988), and waivers
of certain statutory rights, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Inc., 415 U.S.
36, 51-52 (1974).
19 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom
to Contract, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 283, 284 (1995) (“In the area of contract law, the
efficiency argument concludes that courts should enforce all voluntary
contracts that do not produce negative externalities, regardless of their
distributive consequences. If a contract is voluntary, then it presumptively
improves the well-being of both parties.”).
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crash, and personal circumstances may change. However, since
parties would not waste the effort to make agreements that would
not be enforced, everyone is better off under a system of contractual
enforcement.20
Although freedom of contract is essential to our economic
system, economic theory recognizes that freely formed contracts will
not always be efficient. If parties knew exactly what the outcome of
each contract would be, they would know the costs and benefits and
would be able to determine the relative efficiency. But parties do not
always have perfect information, and parties may sometime be
mistaken about the effects that a contract will have on their social
utility. The most obvious example is fraud: when one parties
contracts to buy an authentic antique, his utility will be reduced if
that “antique” is later discovered as a clever knockoff.21 But parties
often contract with incomplete and incorrect information, and they
may not always choose an outcome which improves their utility.
While contract law has delineated some such agreements as
unenforceable,22 there is no general principle that only efficient
agreements will be enforced. Instead, our system presumes that
parties will act rationally and will have sufficient information to
make generally efficient decisions.23
However, as economists recognize, parties do not always
have sufficient information. In fact, it is sometime rational not to
have such information: for example, when the costs of obtaining this
information would outweigh the benefits derived from it.24 If we
know that a certain type of contract will require information that will
be systematically too costly to obtain, we may question whether such
contracts actually do increase societal efficiency. We can obtain
insight into this possibility by modeling the actual decision made by
parties to such a contract. What follows are efforts to model of the
For a discussion of other potential justifications for contract, see Randy
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986).
21 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 110.
22 For example, contract law allows parties to void some agreements on the
basis of mistake. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.1– 9.4 (3d ed.
1999).
23 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 4.
24 See id. at 18.
20
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decisionmaking process that goes into decisions to arbitrate or
litigate, both before and after disputes have arisen. I begin with the
simpler model: the decision to arbitrate or litigate after the dispute
has arisen.
A. The Cost-Benefit Analysis behind the Post-Dispute Arbitration
Agreement
In our system of dispute resolution, litigation is the “default
rule” – namely, the result that will take place unless the parties agree
to a different alternative. One possible alternative to litigation is
arbitration.25 The decision to take a legal dispute to arbitration,
rather than the court system, is presumptively one that a party will
make only if he or she will be better off in arbitration. This decision
can be made simply by weighing the costs and benefits of both
options.
The potential benefits of litigation, at least to the party
bringing the suit, are the expected relief that will be granted minus
the costs of bringing the suit in the first place. The expected relief is
the value of the likely damages (and other relief) discounted by the
probability that the party will win the suit. The cost-benefit analysis
of such a decision could thus be expressed as:
P*R – C
where P is the probability of success, R is the value of the expected
relief, and C is the cost of bringing the suit (attorneys’ fees, court
costs, etc.).26 By conducting the analysis for both arbitration and

25 For purposes of this paper, arbitration means a method of dispute
resolution in which the parties present their case to an arbitrator or
arbitrators, who then issue a decision on the case. Interestingly, there is no
definition of arbitration in the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C §§ 1 – 16
(2000).
26 This litigation model is based on models developed and used in seminal
law and economics articles. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note P1, at 567-71;
Hylton, supra note H1, at 218-29; Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265 (2002);
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Dispute for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Shavell, supra note SS1, at 23. The cost variable (C)
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litigation, an employee could determine which alternative offered the
most utility by determining which provided the higher value. Thus,
the decision to choose arbitration over litigation could be expressed
as:
Pa*Ra – Ca > Pl*Rl - Cl
An example of such a calculation might go as follows: Employee
Amy has a claim against her employer. She knows that if she took
the claim to litigation, she would have a 70 percent chance of
winning an average award of $10,000. But she knows that her costs,
including attorney’s fees, be $3000. If she chose arbitration, she
knows she would only have a 60 percent chance of winning $8,000.
However, her costs would only be $500. Since the net expected
utility of arbitration would be (0.7 * $10000) – $3000, or $4000, and the
net expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * $8000) – $500, or
$4300, Amy would choose arbitration. Amy’s employer AA Co.
would conduct the same cost-benefit analysis, except that (a) it
would be trying to minimize its losses, rather than maximize gains,
and (b) its costs for both litigation and arbitration would be different.
Thus, if AA Co. has costs of $1000 for litigation and $500 for
arbitration, the net expected value of litigation would be calculated
as (0.7 * -$10000) – 1000, or -$8000, and the net expected value of
arbitration would be (0.6 * -$8000) – 500, or -$5300. 27 AA Co. would
also choose arbitration.
Obviously, this cost-benefit analysis is a simplified version of
a much more complicated assessment of litigation and arbitration
outcomes.28 But the factors discussed above are the basic factors by
also includes various non-direct costs, such as the cost of publicity if the suit
is litigated. In the examples I provide, I will assume such costs are zero.
27 For purposes of this model, I assume both parties have perfect
information about the plaintiff’s likelihood of success and the potential for
relief. Many litigation models assume that the parties will have different
expectations about their likelihood of success. The possibility for such
divergence is discussed later in this section.
28 For example, the probability of success and expected relief factors could
encompass a variety of possibilities: a 40 percent chance of getting nothing,
a 20 percent chance of getting $10,000, a 20 percent chance of getting
$30,000, a 15 percent chance of getting $60,000, a 4 percent chance of getting
$200,000, and a 1 percent chance of getting $1,000,000.
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which the parties would make their assessments about choice of
forum. Moreover, if we can make certain assumptions about those
factors, we can make certain predictions about how the parties will
behave. For example, if we assume that: (1) litigation will always
have a higher expected relief (P * R) than arbitration for the
employee, and (2) costs for arbitration will always be lower for both
sides than will costs for litigation, then a rational employer will
always choose arbitration over litigation.29 Moreover, if we make the
same assumptions, an employee will choose arbitration if the
difference in costs between arbitration and litigation is greater than
the difference in expected relief between litigation and arbitration. In
the example above, the difference in costs for the employee was
$3000 - $500, or $2500, which is greater than the difference between
(0.7 * 10000) and (0.6 * 8000), which would be $2200.30
Although the two assumptions discussed above perhaps
represent the conventional wisdom on the subject, we cannot say
empirically that they are true. Proponents of arbitration would argue
with the assumption that the employee always has a higher expected
relief in litigation than arbitration.31 Arbitrators should be no more
biased against employees than juries, they would argue, and an
arbitral award might have a higher expected value, since it would be
granted more quickly than a litigation award.32 However, opponents
of arbitration would argue that litigation costs will not necessarily be
higher than arbitration costs, especially given the need to pay for the

Expressed as an equation, since (Pa * Ra) < (Pl * Rl), and Ca < Cl, and an
employer is seeking to reduce its costs, it will always choose arbitration.
30 Again, this calculation could be expressed as follows: the employee will
choose arbitration if:
Cl – Ca > (Pl * Rl) – (Pa * Ra)
31 See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
559, 564 (2001).
32 A recent study of employment arbitration and litigation amongst higherpaid employees found no statistically significant differences between
employee win rates or award levels in arbitration and litigation. Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An
Empirical Comparison, available at: Social Science Research Network
Library, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=389780.
29
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arbitrators themselves.33 This paper makes to effort to ascertain
whether arbitration is generally more or less fair, or more or less
expensive. My point here is that economically rational employers
and employees would calculate the costs and benefits of an
arbitration agreement before deciding to sign, and would only
execute the agreement if the benefits outweigh the costs.
In the hypothetical above, the decision to choose arbitration
over litigation is efficient for both Amy and AA Co., leading them
both to choose it independently. What if arbitration was a better deal
for the employer, but the employee expected a better result from
litigation? If they have perfect knowledge, we would still expect that
the parties would choose the forum that provides the greatest utility
for both parties as a whole. As the Coase Theorem teaches us, the
initial assignment of rights – in this example, the right of the
employee to choose litigation – should not stand in the way of
arbitration if arbitration is the more efficient result.34 If the parties
have perfect information and can freely bargain, then the employer
would bargain with the employee to choose arbitration. Although
arbitration, standing alone, would make the employee worse off than
litigation, the employer would compensate the employee sufficiently
so that the employee would find it more advantageous to choose
A recent report by Public Citizen found no evidence that arbitration
reduces the overall transaction costs of litigation. See Public Citizen, The
Costs
of
Arbitration,
May
10,
2002,
available
at:
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7173.
34 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1990) (discussing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 5-7 (1960)). The Coase Theorem has been the
subject of intense academic discussion and debate as to its meaning and
validity. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The
Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 398 (1997) (arguing
that Coase never believed his Theorem applied to the real world); Stephen
G. Medema, Through a Glass Darkly or Just Wearing Dark Glasses? Posin,
Coase, and the Coase Theorem, 62 TENN. L. REV. 1041, 1041 n.4 (1995) (citing
attempts to “prove, disprove, confirm or refute the Coase Theorem”); Daniel
Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: Through a Glass Darkly, 61 TENN. L. REV. 797,
799 (1994) (arguing that the Coase Theorem is “in error”). Although I do not
wish to wade into this debate, the Theorem seems like straightforward sense
when applied in this situation.
33
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arbitration. Ultimately, the parties would agree to whichever
outcome would be more efficient overall.35
In order to model this process, we need to compare the
employee’s cost-benefit analysis with the employer’s cost benefit
analysis. When calculating combined utility for the two parties, we
would compare the joint utilities of arbitration with the joint utilities
of litigation. Thus, the parties would choose arbitration if:
(Pa * Ra) – Ca(ee) + (Pa * -Ra) – Ca(er) > (Pl * Rl) – Cl(ee) + (Pl * -Rl) – Cl(er)
Interestingly, the expected relief (P * R) drops out of the equation,
since the value of the expected relief is the same for both parties, but
is a benefit for the employee (P * R) and a cost for the employer (P * R). Thus, the calculation could be more simply expressed as
arbitration will be chosen if:
– Ca(ee) – Ca(er) > – Cl(ee) – Cl(er)36
In other words, the parties would choose arbitration if the joint costs
of taking the claim to arbitration are less than the joint costs of taking
the claim to litigation.
This determination is significant, because if the costs for both
parties are always less in one forum than the other – say, arbitration,
then arbitration will always be the most efficient outcome. And
therefore, if the employer and employee have perfect knowledge and
can bargain, they will always choose arbitration, no matter how
much more favorable arbitration is to one party. As an example,
imagine a situation where the arbitration is heavily stacked in favor
of the employer. Employee Bob has a claim that has a 90 percent
chance of earning him $100,000 in litigation, but only a 10 percent
chance of earning him $20,000 in arbitration. His costs in litigation
would be $400, and his costs in arbitration would be $500.37 Bob
Cf. Hylton, supra not H1, at 212 n.5 (“[A]mong informed parties the
incentive to waive the right to litigate is observed when and only when
litigation reduces society’s social wealth.”).
36 This equation could also be represented as:
Arbitration is chosen if:
Ca(ee) + Ca(er) < Cl(ee) + Cl(er
37 I set litigation costs as lower than arbitration costs to weight Bob’s
preference for litigation even more heavily.
35
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would readily choose litigation after making the following cost
benefit analysis:
(0.1 * $20000) – $500 = $1500 < (0.9 * $100000) – $400 = $89600
In comparing the possible outcomes of arbitration and litigation, the
employer BB Inc. faces the same probability of loss as Bob does for
gain: namely, a 90 percent chance of losing $100,000 in litigation, but
only a 10 percent chance of losing $20,000 in arbitration. However,
let’s assume that BB Inc. has costs of $2000 in litigation and $500 in
arbitration. Thus, BB Inc. would want to pursue arbitration based on
the following analysis:
(0.1 * -$20000) - $500 = -$2500 > (0.9 * -$100000) - $2000 = -$92000
As discussed above, joint utility is calculated solely based on the
costs of both methods, since the expected returns for both sides
cancel each other out.38 The following equation illustrates that
arbitration has a higher joint utility than litigation:
– Ca(ee) ($500) – Ca(er) ($500) = -$1000 > – Cl(ee) ($400) – Cl(er) ($2000) =
-$2400
Arbitration will save the parties $1400 in joint efficiency.
How would the employer convince the employee to take the
case to arbitration? BB Inc. would have to pay Bob the difference in
utility. Since litigation has a greater utility of $88,100 for Bob, but
arbitration has a greater utility of $89,500 for BB Inc., both parties
would be better off if BB Inc. paid Bob between $88,100 and
$89,499.99 to take the case to arbitration. If the employer paid, say,
$89,000 to the employee, Bob’s calculation would be:
(0.1 * $20000) – $500 + $89,000 = $90,500 (arb) > (0.9 * $100000) – $400
= $89,600 (lit)
The $90,000 expected return to the employee through litigation is an
expected $90,000 loss to the employer, while expected the $2000 expected
return to the employee through arbitration is an expected $2000 loss to the
employer.
38
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while BB Inc.’s calculation would be:
(0.1 * -$20000) - $500 - $89,000 = -$91,500 (arb) > (0.9 * -$100000) $2000 = -$92,000 (lit)
Thus, both parties would agree to arbitrate. They would split the
efficiency surplus: Bob would receive $900 of the surplus, and BB Inc.
would receive $500 of it.
Thus, if the parties have perfect information and can freely
bargain, they will always choose the method of dispute resolution
that has the lowest total cost for both sides. In our example above,
arbitration represented a double hit for employee Bob: not only was
his expected reward much greater in litigation than in arbitration, but
his costs were higher in arbitration as well. However, since BB Inc.’s
costs were significantly higher in litigation than in arbitration, it was
more efficient for the parties to choose arbitration. In order to
persuade Bob to choose this route, however, BB Inc. needs to pay him
the difference from the surplus that arbitration generated for it. Even
after paying this large sum, BB Inc. would still be better off than it
would have been going to litigation.39
Of course, if the parties had perfect information about the
expected value of the claim, they would be able to settle the claim
and avoid incurring dispute resolution costs entirely.40 Litigation is a
response to uncertainty – uncertainty about the chance of victory, the
potential award, and the costs of litigating. Parties may not settle if
they do not agree upon the basic components of the decision to settle:
39 Note that this payment is only necessary because the employee has a right
to take the case to litigation, and therefore has a veto over arbitration. If
arbitration was the societal default, the parties would choose arbitration
without any exchange of funds.
40 See POSNER, supra not P1, at 567 (“That cases are ever litigated rather than
settled might appear to violate the principle that when transaction costs are
low, parties will voluntarily transact if a mutually beneficial transaction is
possible.”); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 112
(1994) (“As long as the costs of trial are higher than the costs of settlement,
and as long as both sides make an identical estimate of the likely outcome of
the trial, the case should settle.”).
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the probability the plaintiff will win, the expected value of the
plaintiff’s relief, and the costs incurred by both sides in litigating.41
Since all of these components are predictions, parties will have
different sets of predictions. The same holds true for the decision to
choose arbitration instead of litigation. Once parties have failed to
settle their claim, they may then make a decision about whether to
take the claim to arbitration. If the parties both have perfect
information about these various factors, and can then bargain over
which outcome to choose, they will reach the most efficient result.
But if the parties base their decision on different sets of information,
then they may not come to the efficient conclusion. They may either
fail to agree on the most efficient outcome, or they may both agree to
the less efficient outcome.42 Again, an example may best illustrate
this.
As discussed above, both employee and employer would
choose arbitration under the following scenario: Employee Amy has
a 70 percent chance of winning an average award of $10,000, with
costs of $3000, in litigation, while under she would have a 60 percent
chance of winning $8,000, with costs of $500. Since the net expected
utility of arbitration would be (0.7 * $10000) – $3000, or $4000, and the
net expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * $8000) – $500, or
$4300, Amy should choose arbitration. However, let us suppose that
Amy has information which leads her to calculate the expected
benefits of litigation and arbitration incorrectly . For example, Amy
may believe that she has a 90 percent chance of winning $20,000 in
litigation, but only a 40 percent chance of winning $5,000 in
arbitration. Even with perfect information about costs, Amy would
make the incorrect decision to litigate the case, since her (incorrect)
See POSNER, supra note P1, at 568 (“Settlement might appear especially
unlikely if the parties, by virtue of having different information about the
strength of their respective cases, do not agree on the likely outcome of the
litigation.”).
42 In settlement negotiations, settling the case will always be the more
efficient choice, since settlement costs will always be less than litigation
costs. However, in choosing between arbitration and litigation, the parties
may determine that litigation actually costs less than arbitration. Thus, a
failure to reach an agreement to arbitrate will not always lead to an
inefficient result, while the failure to reach an agreement to settle always
will.
41

EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

16

expected benefit of litigation (0.9 * $20000 – $3000 = $15,000) would
be much higher than her (incorrect) expected benefit of arbitration
(0.4 * $5000 – $500 = $1500). AA Co. would be unwilling to pay Amy
the $13,500 necessary to convince her to arbitrate,43 and therefore
Amy would inefficiently take the case to court.
As in all cost-benefit analyses, information is crucial to
determining whether to arbitrate or litigate. Thus, the relative
efficiency of parties’ decisions to litigate or arbitrate will depend on
how closely their information about those two processes, and their
predictions based on that information, resemble the reality of the
situation. If parties consistently make poor predictions based on
incorrect assumptions about the differences between the two forums,
then parties may make consistently inefficient decisions. For
example, as illustrated in the hypothetical above, if employees
consistently overestimate their potential for litigation success, but
underestimate their potential for arbitral success, they may
inefficiently choose litigation over arbitration.
Based on our cost benefit model, we can draw several
conclusions about potential agreements to arbitrate employment
claims after those claims have arisen. First, the forum with the lower
costs will be the more efficient choice. Second, if the parties have
perfect information about the probability of success, expected relief,
and costs in each forum with respect to the claim at issue, they will
bargain to reach the most efficient outcome. Third, if parties do not
have perfect information, they may end up in the less efficient forum.
B. The Cost-Benefit Analysis behind the Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreement
Thus far we have been modeling the decision to arbitrate or
litigate after the employee’s dispute has arisen. However, predispute employment arbitration agreements are signed at the
beginning of employment, well before any disputes have arisen.
In the case discussed above involving Amy, we said that AA Co. had costs
of $1000 for litigation and $500 for arbitration, and thus the net expected
value of litigation for the employer would be calculated as (0.7 * -$10000) –
1000, or -$8000, and the net expected value of arbitration would be (0.6 * $8000) – 500, or -$5300. Thus, the employer would only be willing to pay A
up to $2700 to arbitrate, rather than litigate.
43
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Although the types of claims covered by a particular agreement is
left up to the parties, a standard scope of coverage is all claims
arising from the course of employment, including common law
claims as well as state and federal statutory claims.44 In order to
determine whether it is more efficient to assign all of these claims to
arbitration, both employers and employees will want to know the
same type of information as in the post-dispute context: their
probability of success in arbitration and litigation, their expected
gains (or losses) from both forums, and their costs in both forums.
There is, of course, one major difference. In the post-dispute context,
the parties know exactly what the dispute is about, and therefore
what the legal claim will be. In the pre-dispute context, the parties
will have to make another prediction: the types and the likelihood of
the different claims that could arise during the employment
relationship. Moreover, employees are often asked to sign a predispute arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. That
means that employees must weigh the costs and benefits of this
agreement against another factor: the costs and benefits of taking this
job, as opposed to a different job that may or may not require a predispute arbitration agreement. The employee is not deciding the
merits of arbitration versus litigation as a stand-alone proposition;
instead, such a comparison must then be weighed against the costs
and benefits of this job as opposed to other potential jobs. The
calculations are much more complicated.
As in the post-dispute context, an employee’s decision to sign
a pre-dispute agreement will be based on the probability of success,
the expected relief, and the costs of arbitration as compared with the
probability of success, the expected relief, and the costs of litigation.
We expressed this model in the post-dispute context as:
Pa*Ra – Ca compared with Pl*Rl - Cl
However, rather than considering this with respect to one dispute
with ascertained facts and a cause (or causes) of action, the employee
must make the decision as to the potential likely causes of action that
may arise during her employment. To be even more precise, the
44 This model assumes that the “claims” at issue are those brought by an
employee against an employer.

EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

18

employee must predict the myriad possibilities of different factual
scenarios involving employment law claims. After all, potential
employment claims can vary widely in their expected likelihood of
success, their relief, and their costs of litigation.45
How do we go about modeling this? In the post-dispute
context, the calculation was much simpler: take the probability of
success, expected relief, and probable costs of the action that has
already arisen. For example, in a potential Title VII case, the
employee would ask: given what happened, what are my chances of
success? Is my case based on statistical data, or is there a smoking
gun proving direct discrimination? The expected relief is also
possible to calculate. Did the employee lose wages? Did the
employee suffer personal pain, humiliation, and suffering? Are
punitive damages a possibility?
Again, employees and their
attorneys can work through the Kolstad factors46 to determine
whether they have a valid claim for punitive damages, and whether
the arbitration forum will accept punitive damages claims. Costs are
also possible to calculate. What is the complexity of the case? What
is the evidence that each side has? Predictions about these matters
can be based on an actual situation. The fact that most parties settle
supports the inference that parties can make rational calculations on
these matters.47
Consider, now, these calculations from the perspective of a
prospective employee. Overall, the employee will be attempting to
This is true even if you limit the potential claims to a particular cause of
action. For example, the expected relief would be much lower in a
statistically-based failure-to-promote Title VII case than would a Title VII
case involving termination for failure to accede to a sexual quid pro quo.
46 In Kolstad v. Am.Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1994), the Supreme Court
set forth factors to be considered when making a punitive damages
determination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
47 Most estimates find that between eighty-five and ninety-five percent of
cases are resolved before trial. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339,
1339-40 (1994). Galanter and Cahill observe, however, that many of these
cases are resolved through judicial decisions on important or dispositive
motions, or even through arbitration. They argue that two-thirds is a better
estimate of the number of cases that settle voluntarily (i.e., without a
definitive judicial ruling). Id. at 1340.
45
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determine the difference in value between taking claims to
arbitration and taking claims to litigation. But how would an
employee go about figuring that out? One possibility would be to
rely on statistics about the overall difference between arbitration
outcomes and litigation outcomes. Such statistics are not readily
available. But even if they were, they would only be a crude
approximation, for a number of reasons. First, settlements are not
included in the statistics. Employees who do not sign pre-dispute
agreements may be in a position to achieve more lucrative
settlements than those who sign arbitration agreements. And since
such settlements are generally confidential, it is impossible to get a
sense of the difference. Second, national averages are at best a rough
approximation of the costs and benefits to this particular employee
working at this particular firm. Since parties are given the freedom
to craft their own rules and procedures for the arbitral forum, the
employee would have to assess the system of rules and procedures
offered by this employer against the rules and procedures generally
used in other arbitrations. Even if arbitration results are roughly
comparable to litigation results at the national level, this employer’s
arbitration system may have results that differ widely from the
national average.
However, the most crucial difference in the pre-dispute
context is that the employee has to factor in a new variable: the
likelihood that any particular fact scenario will arise during the
course of employment. In other words, the employee will have to
determine the likelihood that the employer will violate an
employment law covered under the agreement – any employment
law – during the course of his or her employment. Thus, to be
completely thorough, an employee would have to (1) contemplate
each of a myriad of different scenarios under which the employee
would be entitled to legal relief, (2) determine the likelihood of each
individual scenario, and (3) determine how each scenario would fare
in terms of probability of success, expected relief, and costs in both
litigation and arbitration.
Thus, the cost-benefit analysis for each agreement would
have to take all of these factors into account in comparing arbitration
with litigation. This calculation might be expressed as follows:
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[X(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [X(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a – C(n)a)]
as compared with
[X(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [X(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l – C(n)l)]48
In this model, X is the probability of any particular factual scenario
arising, and (n) represents the total number of different scenarios an
employee could encounter during the course of employment. The
other variables would remain the same, but would need to be
calculated for each scenario. P(1)a, for example, would represent the
probability of success at arbitration for claims relating to the first
potential scenario. Through this model the employee is calculating
the probability of success, the expected relief, and the costs for each
possible fact scenario, and then discounting this by the probability
that the scenario will occur. The totals for all such possible scenarios
are then added up for arbitration and then for litigation, and the
employee would choose whichever is higher.
A greatly (perhaps absurdly) simplified example of such a
calculation would be as follows: Employee Claire is going to work for
an employer who wants her to sign a pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate. She knows that there is a 10 percent chance that she will be
sexually harassed by her fellow employees in a manner that is
tolerated by the employer, and a 5 percent chance that her supervisor
will blatantly discriminate against her. Under the co-employee
harassment scenario, Claire has a 50 percent chance of winning
$10,000 from a jury, with costs of $1000, while she has a 40 percent
chance of winning $8,000 from an arbitrator, with costs of $500.
Under the supervisor discrimination scenario, she has a 80 percent
chance of winning $100,000 from a jury (including punitive
damages), with costs of $4000, while she has a 80 percent chance of
winning $50,000 from an arbitrator, with costs of $1000. Her
calculation would be as follows:

48

This comparison could also be expressed as:

∑

1
n

X * (Pa * Ra - Ca) compared with ∑n X * (Pl * Rl - Cl)
1
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Litigation
(0.1 * ((0.5 * $10,000) - $1000)) + (0.05 * ((0.8 * $100,000) - $4000)) =
$400 + $3800 = $4200
Arbitration
(0.1 * ((0.4 * $8000) - $500)) + (0.05 * ((0.8 * $50,000) - $1000)) = $350 +
$1950 = $2300
Thus, since the expected value of litigating the potential claims
would be $4200, while the expected value of arbitrating the expected
claims would be $2300, Claire would choose not to sign the
arbitration agreement, all else being equal. Alternatively, Claire
would require a payment of at least $1900.01 in exchange for signing
the arbitration agreement.49
If employees had perfect knowledge, they would be able to
determine the efficiency of choosing to sign a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement, and they would be able to bargain with the employer to
arrive at the most efficient outcome. But the likelihood that any
employee would have anything approaching the necessary “perfect
information” to make such a decision is surely close to zero.50 In
comparison to the information available to employees in the postdispute context, pre-dispute information borders on fantasy. After a
dispute has arisen, the facts of the dispute are largely known to
employer and employee, and both sides can make predictions about
the likelihood of success, potential damages, and potential costs. But
at the beginning of an employment relationship, the employee would
have to know the likelihood of success, potential damages, and
potential costs for actions which have not yet happened. And she
would have to know the likelihood that those actions would take
49 If the employer paid Claire $1900.01 to sign the arbitration agreement, her
expected value for the agreement would be $2300 + $1900.01, or $4200.01.
The expected value of litigation for Claire is $4200.
50 See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 525 (2001) (“A
fundamental problem with enforcing [pre-dispute waivers and arbitration
agreements] is the inability of employees and applicants to assess the
choices offered, because there is no contemporaneous and concrete
employment dispute at the time the employees or applicants agree to forego
litigation over past and present claims or to submit future claims to
arbitration.”).
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place. While a new employee may have a hazy sense of the potential
for legal claims arising out of the workplace, and may even have a
sense of whether this particular employer has a past history of illegal
activity, she would need clairvoyance to determine the likelihood
that her employer would violate her employment rights. Even if the
employer kept meticulous track of such violations, and provided
data to new employees on arrival, that data would offer no guarantee
that past trends would continue into the future. The hiring of a new
supervisor, an unexpected merger, and even the employee’s personal
choices about marriage, pregnancy, or dating could affect the
likelihood that the employer will violate the employee’s rights.
Moreover, new causes of action could arise, or courts could take a
stricter interpretation of existing statutes.
There is also the potential moral hazard problem. “Moral
hazard” refers to the tendency of an insured person to relax her
precautionary measures because she no longer has to worry about an
unfavorable outcome.51 In the post-dispute context, an agreement to
arbitrate will not affect the employer’s decision to engage in
prohibited conduct, since the agreement applies only to an event that
has already occurred. However, in the pre-dispute context, a binding
agreement not to litigate may affect whether an employer engages in
prohibited behavior or whether it takes precautionary measures
against such behavior.52 If the arbitration agreement changes the
expected costs and benefits of engaging in arguable prohibited
behavior, the employer will have different incentives with regard to
that behavior.
This point is most simply shown by considering a pre-dispute
agreement to waive all claims. If an employee were to sign an
agreement waiving all statutory claims against the employer, then
the employer would have no incentive to prevent such claims from
arising.
The employer would have no incentive to make
precautionary efforts – namely, efforts to prevent its employees and
managers from engaging in activities which violate the employee’s
rights.53 The expected costs of litigation would normally provide a
POSNER, supra note P1, at 109.
See Hylton, supra note H1, at 218.
53 Indeed, to the extent that the “employer” is a person – a sole proprietor,
say – the employer him- or herself could engage in such activity if he or she
51
52
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significant “cost” to the illegal behavior, and thereby justify the
precautionary measures. However, the waiver agreement’s litigation
elimination removes those costs.
As Keith Hylton has pointed out, a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement has much in common with a waiver agreement. “An
arbitration agreement, after all, is simply a form of waiver, in which
the plaintiff waives the right to sue in court rather than the right to
sue altogether.”54 If the arbitration agreement provides the parties
with a forum than is more favorable to the employer, the employer’s
cost of engaging in prohibited activity will be reduced. That
reduction may in turn lead the employer to curtail its precautionary
efforts. The employer’s decision will be based on a comparison
between the costs of the precaution and the bias of the arbitral forum.
Of course, the employer will not know exactly what damage the
prohibited activity will cause, or the exact difference in bias between
arbitration and litigation. But if an employer sets up a completely
one-sided arbitration regime, the employer will be able to discount
the costs of the prohibited activity significantly. This may lead to a
greater probability that the employer fails to take precautions against
such activity.55
derived utility from such behavior. Although some individuals may derive
utility from discrimination itself, this utility is generally ignored for
purposes of cost-benefit analyses. For more about notions of utility in
discriminatory practices, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
54 Hylton, supra note H1, at 223.
55 In the example provided in his paper, Prof. Hylton supposes that an
employer’s agents could potentially be involved in an activity that would
cause $100 in damage to the employee. If the employer takes care, the
chance of such an injury is ¼; if no care is taken, the chance of injury is ¾.
The cost of care is $25. Hylton then assumes that litigation would always
correctly award the employee $100 if the injury took place. Under such a
regime, the employer would take care, as the cost of taking care [$25 + (1/4
* $100) = $50] would be less than the cost of not taking care [3/4 * 100 = $75].
However, suppose the employer and employee had signed a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. If the arbitral forum were biased against the
employee, such that the employer was only held liable 25 percent of the
time, the employer would not take care [3/4 (.25 * $100) = $18.75] rather
than take care [$25 + (1/4 * (.25 * $100)) = $31.25]. See Hylton, supra note H1,
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In deciding whether to sign a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement, the employee would have to take this “moral hazard”
problem into account. The probability that a particular scenario
raising employment law issues would occur (represented by X in our
equation) would not be the same for arbitration and litigation. If one
forum is more favorable to the employer than the other, then the
extent of the favorability will affect the employer’s probability of
engaging in the activity. Thus, we must have separate probabilities
for arbitration. The new analysis would look like this:
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a – C(n)a)]
as compared with
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l – C(n)l)]56
The only difference in this equation is that instead of X representing
the probability of the event in both sets of equations, there is a Xa for
arbitration and a Xl for litigation. This is a small but significant
change because of the calculation it represents. Now, instead of just
determining the probability that the employer will engage in
prohibited activity, the employee must determine the probability as
affected by two different adjudicatory regimes. The difference will
be determined by using the variances between the expected costs of
arbitration [(P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)], the expected costs of litigation
[(P(1)l*R(1)l – C(1)l)], and the costs of any precautionary measures
that could be taken. This will vary for each potential situation.57
To add another complicating factor, many (if not most) predispute arbitration agreements are not separately negotiated; they
are instead part of the overall employment package offered to the
at 219, 224. Hylton’s example also included the costs of arbitration, which I
have left out for simplicity.
56

Or:

∑

1
n

Xa * (Pa * Ra - Ca) vs. ∑n Xl * (Pl * Rl - Cl)
1

One would expect that as the arbitral forum gets more and more unfair,
the likelihood of prohibited activity increases. However, at some point the
arbitral forum becomes so unfair that the there is a likelihood of a successful
challenge to the agreement. Thus, the calculation would not be strictly
linear.
57
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employee.58 Thus, the employee cannot look at the agreement
separately and decide whether the agreement, standing alone, will
increase the employee’s utility. Instead, the employee has to weigh
the expected value of the arbitration agreement in conjunction with
the overall expected utility of taking the particular job. Imagine a
prospective employee, having gone through a job search and
interview process, who is then presented with a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement to sign prior to employment. The employer
may treat it like just another of the many forms that an employee has
to fill out. If the employer expresses a willingness to talk about and
negotiate over the agreement, then the employee has an incentive to
perform an independent cost-benefit analysis. But if the employer
presents the agreement as a condition of employment, the employee
has no choice about the agreement itself. Instead, the employee must
weigh the costs and benefits of accepting the job at hand, including
the pre-dispute arbitration agreement, with the costs and benefits of
going back out on the job market. A simplified version of such a
decision would be:
J1 + [Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a – C(n)a)]
as compared with
(ρ2 * ( J2 + α2)) + (ρ 3 * (J3+ α 3)) + . . . + (ρ jn * (Jjn+ α jn))
In this model, J1 is the sum of the overall costs and benefits of the job
on the table, such as wages, benefits, hours of work required, type of
work required, relationship with colleagues, prospects for future
promotion, and so on. The only factor not included in J1 would be
the estimated value of the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Of
course, J1 represents an amalgam of equations similar to the one
constructed for the arbitration agreement. The final expected value

Exact figures are unavailable on the percentage of employers who require
employees to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.
However, a number of high profile cases have involved such agreements.
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir.
2001); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
58
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of the current job would be compared with the expected values for
all other possible jobs.
As for the other variables, jn represents the total number of
potential jobs available to the employee. The J variable represents
the expected value for each other job that might be available
(excluding the arbitration issue), and the ρ variable represents the
probability that the employee could get that job. The α variable
represents the expected value of an arbitration agreement, if any, that
would be required as part of that potential job. In other words, the
employee does not know whether other potential jobs will also
require her to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Thus, the
employee would have to determine the likelihood that the other job
will require an arbitration agreement as well as the expected value of
such an agreement (if offered). To break down α, one could
construct the following equation:
α = (Parb * Varb)
In the equation, Parb is the probability that the employer will require
an arbitration agreement, while Varb is the expected value of that
agreement.
To be sure, in order to accept the job in the first place, the
employee would have had to determine that the expected value of
the offered job is higher than the expected value of all alternative
jobs. Or, represented as an equation:
J1 > (ρ2 * J2) + (ρ 3 * J3) + . . . + (ρjn * Jjn)
However, the addition of the arbitration agreement does provide a
significant complicating factor. First, as noted above, the expected
value of the agreement itself is quite difficult to calculate. Second,
even if that can be done, the employee must determine the
probability that other employers will also require such agreements,
and, if they do, whether those agreements will have a similar
expected value. After all, other employers may have fewer or greater
instances of statutory violations, those violations may be more or less
serious, or the arbitration procedures may be fairer or less fair. Since
each employer may differ on these factors, the employee would have
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to develop separate analyses for each employer in order to be
completely accurate.
We have been considering the decision about a pre-dispute
agreement from the perspective of an employee. How would an
employer go about deciding whether to propose an arbitration
agreement? The basic calculation should be the same: whether the
expected value of taking all claims to arbitration would be greater
than the expected value of taking the claims to litigation. This
calculation would have to account for the probability that such
claims would arise. As we noted above, the decision might be
expressed as:
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a – C(n)a)]
as compared with
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l – C(n)l)]
Thus, the employer too would seem to be faced with a difficult
decision to unpack.
However, the employer has several
informational advantages over employees when it comes to making
this calculation
The employer has access to more information about the
probability that it will engage in the prohibited behavior (X). The
extent of the employer’s knowledge depends, in part, on the extent to
which one imparts the knowledge of the employer’s agents to the
employer itself. For example, a sole proprietor knows all about his or
her own past history of, and proclivity for, prohibited activity. A
large corporation, on the other hand, may not know what lurks in the
hearts of its middle managers. It at least has information about their
past activities, however, and can make some predictions about their
future activities. Moreover, it can take precautionary efforts to
prevent or mitigate prohibited behavior: screening applicants for
evidence of illegal activity; training new employees about legal rules
and ethical conduct; and monitoring and disciplining employees for
violations of the rules. Knowledge of the extent of precautions taken
by the employer will lead to a better estimation of X.
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The employer is also much more likely to have thorough
information about the arbitral forum than employees. First, the
employer will know the basics about the forum itself: what the
arbitration rules are, how the arbitrators are chosen, whether class
actions are allowed, whether punitive damages may be awarded, and
so on. In fact, the employer may to a large extent craft these rules
itself. Certainly, employers can choose an off-the-rack method of
arbitration, such as the rules and procedures of the American
Arbitration Association.59 But they are choosing the process, and
thereby will acquire significant information about it. Employees may
or may not have access to the procedures when they sign the
arbitration agreement, but they may find it difficult and expensive to
obtain a real understanding of those procedures. Certainly, an
employer may incur costs in choosing and setting up a method of
arbitration, and these costs should be included in the process. But in
exchange for these costs, the employer will have a much better sense
of the effect of the forum on the probabilities of success, the value of
the relief, and the costs of the forum.60 Moreover, the employer will
gain further information about the process over time, as it
experiences actual arbitrations through the agreement. Employees
will likely only have exposure to arbitration once.61
Finally, if the employer knows that its costs will be lower in
arbitration and that its likelihood of success in arbitration will be no
less than in litigation, then the employer knows that an arbitration
agreement will always make economic sense. Certainly, employees
would know the same: they should sign if their costs are lower and
their chance of success is no less. But employers should be able to
establish these conditions with much more certainty than employees
59 See National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, American
Arbitration Association, available at:
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESIT
E\Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\..\focusArea\employment
\AAA121current.html.
60 As discussed below in Part II.A.4, the employer also can spread the costs
of obtaining this knowledge across all of its employee arbitration
agreements, while the employee must absorb the costs individually.
61 The advantages of the employer’s experiences with arbitration over time
are often referred to as the “repeat player effect.” See Bingham, supra note
BI, at 190-91; Cole, supra note CO, at 453.
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could. As noted above, employers can choose the rules and
procedures of the arbitral forum. Thus, employers will know
whether those procedures are no more generous to or biased toward
the employee than litigation procedures. In fact, the employer can
make sure that arbitration procedures do not favor the employee.
Employees could theoretically propose alternative rules and
procedures to make sure the arbitration procedures do not favor the
employer, but the employee is not likely to know enough to propose
a set of alternative rules. In order to develop alternate procedures, an
employee would likely need the costly services of an attorney.
Moreover, an employer is likely to insist on its rules, leaving the
employee to make the calculation as to whether this job offers more
utility than the other potential jobs. The end result is that the
employer’s proposed procedures will likely be the final ones,
enabling the employer to insure that the arbitral process at least does
not favor the employee.
C. Behavioral Concerns about the Pre-Dispute Agreement Analysis
Given the complexity of these analyses, as well as their lack of
information about the underlying factors, it is virtually impossible
for employees to make an accurate valuation of the pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. In the face of this impossibility, employees
might react in different ways. They might assign a high negative
value to the arbitration agreement and refuse to sign any such
agreement. They might assign a minimal negative value, or a
positive value, to such an agreement and sign it without further
thought. Or they might recognize that the agreement has some value
to the employer and negotiate for some payout in exchange for
executing the agreement.
I know of no data, other than anecdotal, that suggests what
employees are actually doing. However, there is psychological
research that suggests employees are likely to assign minimal
positive or negative values to such agreements. The complexity of
the decision would probably drive employees to abandon any effort
to do a cost-benefit analysis.62 While employees may begin to work
62 Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1078 (2000) (“Decision researchers have identified the complexity of a
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through the costs and benefits of signing the agreement, the
difficulties in aggregating the factors, as well as the lack of
information about each factor, would lead an employee to stop short
of a real analysis. In the face of this frustration, employees would be
likely to resolve their dilemma through the use of decision-making
short-cuts, described in the cognitive psychology literature as
“heuristics.”
These heuristics, which have been studied and
developed since the 1970s, have recently received a fair amount of
attention in legal academia. The heuristics form the basis for a new
approach to legal decisionmaking theory, known as “behavioral
decision theory” 63or “behavioral law and economics.”64 This
approach counsels that the rational actor thesis, found at the core of
law and economics, must be tempered based on known
“irrationalities” in human behavior. These irrationalities, according
to some theorists, stem from an adaptive approach to complex or
difficult decisions.
In order to resolve certain types of
decisonmaking quandaries, people will often adopt short cuts, or
heuristics, that lead to non-rational decisions in certain types of
situations.65
The flashpoint we have been examining – the employee’s
decision to sign a predipute agreement – may be subject to influence
by several of the heuristics identified by researchers. Given the
complexities of the pre-dispute agreement analysis, it is not
surprising that employees would resort to some form of
decisionmaking short-cut in deciding whether to sign. A description
of heuristics which may have an effect on the process are described
below.
1. Immediacy bias. Imagine yourself as an employee on your
first day of work at a new job. A human resources administrator
decision as a leading cause of departures from the type of complete costbenefit analysis of decision options predicted by expected utility theory.”).
63 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000).
64 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1534 (1998).
65 Given the savings in time and resources, these heuristics may be
“rational” in the sense that they ultimately are more efficient to the
decisionmaker than traditional cost-benefit analysis. See POSNER, supra note
P1, at 19.
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presents you with, among other forms, a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. The administrator tells you that this agreement is
company policy, and you must sign it in order to be formally
employed. If you begin to think about it, the pros of signing the
agreement are all immediate: you can stay at the job, receive a
paycheck, and continue with your plans for success. The cons are all
uncertain and in the future: if, perchance, you are fired, harassed, or
otherwise injured in violation of the law, you will have to take your
claim to arbitration rather than court. Which factors will be weighted
more heavily in your quick cost-benefit analysis?66
Researchers have found evidence that individuals have a
preference for activities that delivers immediate benefits over those
that delay any potential benefits.67 For example, researchers found
that most subjects preferred a check of $100 available immediately to
a check of $200 that could not be cashed for two years.68 In the case
of employment arbitration, the pull of the immediately available
benefit is even stronger, as the alternatives are generally not certain
prospects. Thus, an employee may have an economically irrational
bias towards the current job and its pre-dispute agreement, based on
the strong psychic pull of the here and now and certain.
2. Optimism bias. The term “optimism bias” refers not to an
overall sunny disposition, but rather to the general tendency of
individuals to underestimate the likelihood that something bad will
happen to them. For example, even though applicants for a marriage
license correctly estimated that the national divorce rate was fifty
percent, their modal estimation of their own chance of divorce was
This hypothetical has resonance with commentators. See, e.g., Victoria J.
Craine, Note, The Mandatory Arbitration Clause: Forum Selection or Employee
Coercion?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 537, 537 (1999); Grodin, supra note G1, at 3-6..
67 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1203-05 (1998)
(discussing evidence of immediacy bias).
68 See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER
TIME 57, 69 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992), cited in Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 655 (1999). Interestingly, the
study found that people did not prefer a $100 check payable in six years to a
$200 check payable in eight years. Id. The lack of immediacy cooled the
irrational preference.
66
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zero.69 College students in another study were six times more likely
to respond that they expected their job satisfaction to be above the
average of their peers than below the average.70
Similarly,
respondents perceived themselves to be less likely than the average
to be unemployed.71 It is apparently human nature to expect oneself
to be less likely than others to suffer from misfortune, or more likely
to experience success. This optimism may extend to the employment
relationship: the employee may place an unrealistically low
probability on the likelihood that some sort of employment law
dispute will arise.72
The optimism bias may be one component of a more complex
set of responses to uncertainty. For example, one theory is that the
optimism bias may be a variant on the “availability heuristic,” which
concerns the effect of one’s pool of knowledge on probabilistic
calculations. In assessing the likelihood of certain events, people are
unduly influenced by their own pool of personal information. They
overestimate the relevance of certain events or instances that are
“available” to their memories in ways that other events may not be.
For example, most people incorrectly believe that homicides and car
accidents kill more Americans than diabetes and stomach cancer.73
Psychology researchers theorize that the basis of this misperception
is the “availability” to people’s memories, primarily through the
media, of instances of car accidents or murders. Instances of diabetes
or stomach cancer deaths receive less attention, although they are
sadly far more common. In the case of events like divorce and
unemployment, individuals who have not experienced these events
69 See Lynn Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993), cited in Hanson & Kysar, supra note HK1, at
655.
70 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 (1980) , cited in Hanson & Kysar,
supra note HK1, at 655.
71 See id.
72 See Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary
Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting
Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1228-30 (2002).
73 See S COTT PLOUS, T HE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
121-22 (1993), cited in Korobkin & Ulen, supra note KU1, at 1088.
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may not have vivid stories “available” to their memories, and would
underestimate the likelihood of such events. If workers have not
experienced an employment dispute, either directly or through the
experience of someone they know, they may underestimate the
likelihood that such an experience would arise.74 Conversely, if they
have such an experience in their information pool, they may
overestimate the likelihood of such an event recurring.75
However, the effects of the optimism or overconfidence bias
seem to extend beyond the scope of one’s experience. Instead, this
optimism seems to play a strong role in shaping the perceptions of
that experience. For example, one study provided a group of law
students with factual information relating to a hypothetical lawsuit.76
Those students assigned to be counsel for the plaintiffs interpreted
the facts as favorable to the plaintiff, while students assigned as
defense counsel interpreted the facts as favorable to the defendant.77
Thus, even if employees were given information about the potential
for employment-related disputes, they might optimistically believe
that they would be able to avoid such disputes. This tendency is
what researchers refer to as the “confirmatory” or “self-serving”
bias.78 As with marriage and unemployment, people do not appear
to enter a job with the expectation that their employment law rights
will be violated. It does not seem unreasonable to predict that
See Reilly, supra note R1, at 1232-33.
One might argue that the increasing publicity about employment disputes
would make such dispute “available” to employees. However, as Sarah
Randolph Cole noted in 1996, “[p]ublicity about the use of arbitration to
resolve employment disputes and the consequent effects arbitration has on
the resolution of discrimination claims is quite limited.” Cole, supra note
RC1, at 481. Although arbitration has received more attention since 1996, it
is hard to measure whether knowledge about such agreements has
permeated the national consciousness.
76 See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993), cited in Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note KU1, at 1088; Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgements of Fairness in
Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995), cited in Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note KU1, at 1088.
77 See Loewenstein et al, supra note L1, at 151-52; Babcock, supra note B1, at
1340.
78 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note KU1, at 1093.
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individuals will assign a smaller probability to the chance of an
employment dispute than reality would require.79
3. Framing effects. Numerous studies have shown that the
way choices are framed has an effect on how individuals make those
choices. This notion may seem like common sense. But framing
effects can work in strange and irrational ways. For example, studies
of employee investment behavior show that employees will alter
their investment strategies based on the choices in front of them.
One such study offered employees the choice between a stock fund
and a bond fund with different rates of return. One group of
employees was shown the one-year rates of return, while another
group was shown a simulated distribution of the thirty-year rates of
returns for the funds. Employees shown the one-year rate invested a
majority of their money in the bond fund, while those shown the
thirty-year rates chose to invest almost everything in the stock fund.80
All of this is to suggest that our decisionmaking processes are
susceptible to influence. We may place undue importance on the
facts as presented to us or as highlighted in a set of materials. In
providing the arbitration agreement for the employee to execute, the
employer has the choice about how to frame the decision. The
employer could tell the employee that the arbitration program offers
a chance for employees to save money on legal bills. Or the
employer could present the agreement as just a mere formality, part
of the set of forms that all employees sign on their first day. An
agreement to arbitrate might be part of an employee handbook, or
may not even be given to the employee. Certainly, more research is
necessary to determine what kinds of framing employers may
engage in, and whether these framing devices have any effects. But it
certainly would not be surprising to find that employees have
different types of reactions to different methods of presenting the
arbitration agreement. Such framing effects add another level of
irrationality to the cost-benefit analysis.
D. The Advantages of Deferring Arbitration Decisions
See Cole, supra note RC1, at 480-81; Reilly, supra note R1, at 1228-30.
See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Risk Aversion or Myopia?
Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments (Nov. 8, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript), cited in Jolls et al., supra note JST1, at 1534.
79
80
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Before discussing the conclusions we can draw from the
models discussed above, a brief summary may be in order. After a
dispute has arisen, the employee and employer will agree to submit
that dispute to arbitration if the expected value of arbitration is
greater than the expected value of litigation. Expressed as an
equation, the parties would choose arbitration if:
Pa*Ra – Ca > Pl*Rl – Cl
If the parties differ as to their preferred forum, one party will pay the
other party to insure that they both agree to the most efficient forum.
Certainly, there is no guarantee that the parties will have the perfect
information necessary to insure an efficient result. But the types of
information required – the probability of success, the potential for
relief, and the estimated costs – are data that parties and professional
players attempt to estimate all the time.
Before the dispute has arisen, the parties must make a
different determination. The pre-dispute decision is far more
complex, particularly for the employee.
The employee must
calculate what the potential costs and benefits would be for all
potential situations involving prohibited activities. Then he must
estimate the probabilities that these situations would arise. As noted
above, the expression of this decision would be:
[Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a – C(n)a)]
as compared with
[Xl(1) * (P(1)l*R(1)l – C(1)l)] + . . . + [Xl(n) * (P(n)l*R(n)l – C(n)l)]
If the agreement is required by the employer, the employee would
have to factor in this agreement in comparing the current job with all
other potential jobs. Again, such a decision could be expressed as:
J1 + [Xa(1) * (P(1)a*R(1)a – C(1)a)] + . . . + [Xa(n) * (P(n)a*R(n)a – C(n)a)]
as compared with
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(ρ2 * ( J2 + α2)) + (ρ 3 * (J3+ α 3)) + . . . + (ρ jn * (Jjn+ α jn))
The information needed for these calculations is far more difficult to
obtain than the simple (P*R) – C. And in all likelihood, the employee
will find it economically inefficient to consult an attorney or other
expert, since (1) the costs of obtaining the information will likely be
greater than the benefits, and (2) the agreement may well be a
condition of employment. Given the impossible task of making an
economically rational decision about such an agreement, employees
are prone to use decisionmaking shortcuts to make up their mind –
shortcuts that may lead to systematically irrational results.
What does this analysis tell us about these agreements? In
my view, it tells us that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are
much more likely to be based on good information, and therefore
much more likely to be not only efficient but optimal for both sides.
Pre-dispute agreements, on the other hand, are more likely to be
based on primitive guesswork, or less, on the part of the employee.
The worse the information, the greater the chance that the
agreements will not be efficient. In addition, the employer is likely to
have a significant informational advantage over the employee.
Employers may use this advantage to construct inefficient
agreements that employees would not agree to if they had perfect
information.81
Keith Hylton has greater faith in the ability of employees to get the
information they need to decide efficiently about pre-dispute agreements.
Hylton believes that employees are making a “rational bet” that they will be
better off as a result of the agreement, and that the parties should be left to
abide by the results of their bet. See Hylton, supra note H1, at 251. My
response to this argument is discussed further in the text infra. Hylton also
argues that employees may be exhibiting “rational apathy” in not attending
to the details of the agreement, on the grounds that the expected costs of
investigation may be too high for the potential benefits gained. See id. at
252. However, the costs for an individual employee might be high enough
that the employee takes a real utility hit, rather than a de minimis loss. In
such cases, the employer can take advantage of the economy of scale to
extract rents from employees unwilling to challenge the employer’s
position. See Cole, supra note RC1, at 475-76. Hylton also argues that
competition amongst employers for employees will drive unfair arbitration
agreements out of the market. See Hylton, supra note H1, at 252-53.
81

EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

37

Of course, there is no general legal requirement that contracts
be efficient. Nor must parties have good information about the
substance of an agreement in order for that agreement to be
enforceable. People make contracts all the time involving risk – risk
which may be very difficult to calculate. When a member of the
public purchases a share of a company’s stock, for example, that
person may have no idea what the real value of that stock should be.
Other players in the market may have access to sophisticated
analyses about the company’s management, the industry’s prospects,
and the economy’s direction. But this person might have purchased
the stock because they liked the company’s logo. Similarly, people
can buy insurance for event about which they know little, in terms of
probability. Homeowners’ insurance is just one example – how
likely are such events as theft, fire, flood or hurricane? How much
should insurance against these events cost? People make illinformed decisions about risk all the time. Why should we care in
this case?82
First, I think we generally do care about situations where one
party is consistently likely to have an informational advantage over
another party. While a person need not conduct a thorough analysis
of a company’s prospects before buying its stock, federal securities
regulation insures that a vast supply of information is available for
those who wish to make use of it. Moreover, those with special
However, if employees do not accurately price those agreements, they will
not realize (until too late) the advantages of such agreements. Thus, an
employer who offered a fair agreement would be punished by the market,
as employees would undervalue such agreements. Finally, Hylton argues
that even if employees can be taken advantage of in the short term, they will
eventually realize this and demand less biased agreements (or not
agreements) in the future. See id. at 253-54. I would agree that, over time,
employees will become more aware of the pros and cons of such
agreements. Their psychological “availability” will increase, particularly if
the media highlights egregious examples of such agreements. Employees
may even band together to get more information about such agreements.
But the time of such awareness has clearly not arrived yet.
82 See id. at 251 (“It is common in contract settings for one party to know
more than the other about some aspect of the deal, and so for the
uninformed party to make a statistical bet that he is better off entering the
contract despite his informational deficit.”).
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insider information are prohibited from trading.
Insurance
companies are heavily regulated by state commissions, in part due to
the informational disadvantage of consumers. Even state lotteries
tell buyers that they only have a 1 in 120 million chance of winning
the Powerball jackpot.83 When there are possible information
discrepancies, the law often steps in to ameliorate such discrepancies
or their effects.
Second, one of the primary ideological bases for contract law
is the notion of Pareto optimality. Two parties will only agree to a
contract if they both expect to be better off from it. Certainly, after
the contract has been fully performed, one side may find itself worse
off than it expected to be. But economically rational parties will not
execute a contract unless they expect it to increase their utility. This
expectation – that everyone will be better off if this exchange occurs –
forms the cornerstone of economic thinking, and also provides the
normative foundation for economic theory. While the wealthmaximization norm in economics has its fair share of critics, the norm
of Pareto optimality is much less controversial.84 Its relative scarcity
in the real-world of policymaking makes it even more attractive
when it does surface.85 Thus, if it turns out that parties are not
making rational calculations that a certain agreement will make them
better off, the normative justifications for contract law are
weakened.86
Third, employment laws provide state-mandated rights to
employees. These laws represent a public decision to compensate
individuals for certain types of injuries. If employees are signing
away important procedural protections for those rights, society has
more of an interest than if employees are merely agreeing to lower
wages. The Supreme Court has found pre-dispute waivers of
employment law rights to be unenforceable, because such rights are
See, e.g., http://www.molottery.state.mo.us/aboutourgames/howtowin
/numbergames/powerball/powerball_understandingodds.shtm
84 See POSNER, supra note P1, at 12 (“Who can quarrel with unanimity as a
criterion of social choice?”).
85 See id. at 13.
86 Of course, some theories of contract law place no reliance on the notion of
Pareto optimality. See Barnett, supra note B1, at 271-91 (discussing different
theoretical justifications for contract).
83
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deemed to represent a societal entitlement.87 The remedial benefits
offered by these statutes, along with the deterrence effects of such
remedies, are deemed to be part of a “congressional command that
each employee be free from discriminatory practices.”88
The
Supreme Court has premised its approval of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements on the notion that they are not waivers of the underlying
substantive rights.89 However, a biased pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate effectively acts as a waiver.90 Even a slightly biased
agreement weakens the effects of the statutory entitlements. Thus, to
the extent employees are taking a risk by using incomplete
information, they are gambling with their congressional entitlements.
Finally, one has to ask, what is the point of the pre-dispute
agreement? What is the “risk” that the agreement is allocating?
After all, an employee can agree to arbitrate a dispute after it arises.
Why constrain that choice beforehand?91 When other contracts are
made based on poor information, the contract is often intended to
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Inc., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) the Court
wrote:
Title VII . . . concerns . . . an individual's right to equal
employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute
and represent a congressional command that each
employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of
necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under
Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.
88 Id. at 51.
89 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991).
90 See Hylton, supra note H1, at 230 (“If the arbitral forum is heavily biased
in favor of the defendant, then an arbitration agreement may be effectively
equivalent to a waiver.”).
91 As one advocate puts it, “If proponents of arbitration are correct in their
belief that it is faster, cheaper and better than the judicial system, then
surely employees and their attorneys will opt for arbitration in a voluntary
system.” See National Organization of Women Testimony, available at:
http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/nasd-testimony.html
(address
of
Patricia Ireland, president of NOW, to a committee of the National
Association of Securities Dealers in June 1997).
87

EFFICIENCY OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

40

hedge the risk inherent in the situation. People buy stocks, for
example, to provide capital to a risky enterprise. The company
receives funds it could not otherwise acquire (due to the risk), and
the stock buyer receives the opportunity to participate in the
company’s profits. The buyer knows that she has imperfect
information, but that risk is part of the reason for the deal. Similarly,
insurance contracts are a straightforward hedge against risk; a
homeowner buys flood insurance to mitigate the financial harms of a
potential flood. But why would parties sign a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement? Are the parties hedging a risk? If so, a risk of what? At
initial glance, the pre-dispute agreement is only a “hedge” against
litigation; it prevents the possibility that the parties will not agree to
arbitrate the dispute later. But both parties will clearly have better
information about the costs and benefits of arbitration after the
dispute arises. Why not wait until then to decide? Why constrain
choice?

II. POTENTIAL THEORIES FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The following section is an effort to answer these questions,
namely by explaining why pre-dispute arbitration agreements may
provide greater efficiency under certain conditions than post-dispute
agreements. It is not enough that the pre-dispute agreements lead to
generally efficient results if those same results could have been
achieved through a post-dispute agreement. As an example, let us
suppose a world where arbitration costs are always less than
litigation and arbitration results are always as equally fair as
litigation results. In such a world, it would be efficient for both
parties to sign a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. But rational
parties would also always agree to arbitrate their dispute after the
dispute arose; there would be no benefit to parties for signing a predispute agreement.92

92 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note SS1, at 5 (“[W]hile reduction in costs is an
advantage of ex ante ADR agreements, it is equally an advantage of ex post
ADR agreements.”).
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Therefore, in order for pre-dispute agreements to serve some
efficiency purpose, they must force some parties into arbitration
when they would not have chosen to do so post-dispute. Moreover,
the agreement must force such parties into a more efficient outcome
than they would have reached without the agreement. The following
are efforts to describe such conditions, grouped in the categories of
(A) ex ante benefits, (B) prevention of irrational arbitration rejection,
and (C) the reduction of societal externalities.
A. Ex Ante Benefits
It is perhaps difficult to imagine a scenario that fits our two
criteria for pre-dispute agreement efficiency: (1) it would be more
efficient for the parties to choose arbitration over litigation to resolve
a particular dispute, but (2) at least one of the parties would not
choose arbitration without the presence of an arbitration agreement.
The Coase theorem teaches that if arbitration is the more efficient
outcome, the parties will bargain and will end up choosing
arbitration. Even though one party might have a preference for
litigation at the outset of negotiations, the parties would ultimately
decide to choose arbitration if arbitration is more efficient. Thus, the
Coase theorem would seem to rebut claims that post-dispute
agreements will never take place because one side or the other will
always prefer litigation after the dispute has arise.93 Even if litigation
always offers an advantage for one side, the parties will negotiate
around the litigation default option if it is more efficient to proceed
to arbitration.
However, the following five possibilities describe how predispute agreements might offer ex ante benefits by constraining the
parties from choosing litigation after the dispute has arisen. In other
words, the pre-dispute agreement provides greater efficiency by
forcing the parties into an arbitration that is socially efficient but
See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary
Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment
Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 37 (2003)
(“In order for a post-dispute arbitration voluntary arbitration system to
work, both the plaintiff’s and the defense lawyer need to conclude that
arbitration’s benefits outweigh its costs and that arbitration represents the
best chance for success for each lawyer.”).
93
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would not have been chosen after the dispute arose. In each case,
although one of the parties would have a post-dispute preference for
litigation that could be overcome through negotiation, the overall
good is better served by preventing that party from litigating.
1. Spreading the benefits. If arbitration provides more efficiency
as between the parties than litigation, the parties will bargain to go to
arbitration. In a post-dispute scenario, the employer and employee
would negotiate to split the benefits that accrue from choosing
arbitration over litigation. Both the employee and employer might
have equally lower litigation costs, and thus would not exchange any
payment as part of the deal. However, in other cases the employer
might have significantly lower costs than the employee would. In
negotiating over the potential forum, each party could bargain to
obtain some of the surplus. For example, assume that an employee is
threatening to bring a suit against an employer. The employee’s
costs would be the same in both arbitration and litigation, but the
suit would cost an employer an estimated $10,000 to litigate but only
$1,000 to arbitrate. The employee would negotiate with the employer
to arbitrate the dispute in exchange for receiving some of the $9,000
in savings.
If we assume a world in which arbitration always saves an
employer significant costs as compared to litigation fees, then a predispute arbitration agreement would save an employer significant
sums. What happens to that money? The employer gets it, but
theoretically employees could bargain for that surplus as well.
However, in the pre-dispute world, the money cannot be allocated
only to those employees who will eventually bring a claim against
the employer. Instead, employees have to bargain individually for
what they believe is their share of the employer’s surplus. If each
employee is a potential claimant, then each employee will deserve a
share of the surplus. As an example, C&C Co. has 10 employees.
Based on the past history of C&C, as well as societal trends, the
employees and the employer would predict that two of these ten
employees will bring claims against the employer during the course
of their career. These claims would each cost the employer $10,000 to
litigate but $1,000 to arbitrate. If all employees choose to sign a predispute agreement, the employer will save $18,000. Each of the ten
employees could therefore negotiate to receive some part of this
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surplus. However, their pro rata share of the surplus would only be
$1,800. Thus, if the employer distributed all of its surplus equally to
the employees, each employee would receive $1,800 for signing the
pre-dispute agreement. However, if employees did not sign such
agreements, two of the employees would be able to negotiate a $9,000
payment when they brought their claims, while the other employees
would receive nothing.
In this example, the pre-dispute agreement serves as a form of
reverse litigation insurance. If you think of litigation as a windfall,
and if employees are risk averse, a risk-averse employee might
choose a 100 percent chance of receiving $1,800 to a 20 percent
chance of receiving $9,000. Thus, a pre-dispute agreement might
provide better overall utility. Certainly, an employee would have no
incentive to voluntarily share his or her settlement with the other
employees after a dispute has arisen. By locking in employees ahead
of time, the pre-dispute agreement insures that the efficiency gains
are spread to all employees, not just those who choose to litigate.
However, there are several problems with this model. First, it
assumes that the employer passes on all of the cost savings to the
employees. Employees, however, are in a much better position to
extract this surplus after the dispute has already arisen. As discussed
in Part I, it is a lot harder to calculate the cost savings for a predispute agreement than it is for a post-dispute agreement. The
employer and employee will know a lot more about the nature of the
claim, and therefore the potential costs, when the claim is on the
table. Moreover, individual employees lack the information to know
exactly what costs savings a pre-dispute agreement will create. As
noted above, the informational difficulties may lead employees to
ignore or guess about the factors that would go into a proper costbenefit analysis of the agreement.
A second problem is that this “reverse” insurance would act
to draw money away from those who are injured and give it to the
rest of the employee class. If an employment claim really were like
the lottery, this development might not raise concerns. However, an
employment claim stems from an injury inflicted in violation of a
legal mandate. Taking money away from the injured to spread
amongst the non-injured seems a perverse method of societal
distribution. In addition, those in the injured class, at least for
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employment discrimination claims, are more likely to be members of
a protected class: racial or ethnic minorities, women, the elderly, or
the disabled. Certainly the policies underlying the civil rights acts
would be undermined by agreements which took money from
injured victims of these groups and distributed it to all employees.
Finally, we’ve been assuming that all of the arbitration “surplus” for
the employer comes from a savings in the costs of litigation. If some
of the surplus comes from a savings in the amount of relief rendered,
then the victims are actually paying for the surplus out of their
entitlement.94 As another example, let us assume DDD Inc. will save
an expected $10,000 if a case is taken to arbitration, not in costs saved
but in a reduction in the expected award. (The expected award from
litigation is $30,000, while the expected award from arbitration is
$20,000.) This may be due to the bias of the arbitrator, an arbitral
limit on certain types of damages, or other factors. Regardless, if an
employee knows about this difference, he or she may negotiate with
DDD to receive it in exchange for taking the case to arbitration. After
all, the employee is entitled to the expected $30,000 benefit under
law. However, under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, the
employee would not be able to bargain for this surplus after the fact;
instead, it would accrue entirely to DDD. Employees might be able
to negotiate for the expected “bias” differential ahead of time.
However, the differential would accrue to all employees, rather than
those who are injured. The injured employees would get only a
fraction of the $10,000 bias differential. This result would obviously
undermine the remedial purposes of the employment law
protections.
Given these objections, the “spreading-the-benefits” theory
fails to provide sufficient efficiency justifications for pre-dispute
agreements.
2. Trading a few big claims for many small ones. A more
promising justification finds its most prominent proponent in Samuel

See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 750
(2001) (noting that if the only source of savings from arbitration is lower
awards, “then the Gilmer rule undoes, to some extent, the effects of the
employment discrimination statute”).
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Estreicher and his “Saturns for Rickshaws” theory.95 According to
Estreicher, litigation is not a usable entitlement for many employees.
For those employees with low wages, less severe employment law
injuries, or less certain litigation outcomes, the costs of litigation may
be too high to bring suit. Most employees cannot pay attorneys
enough to take the suit for a preset fee, and the potential contingency
fees are too small for these claims. Other employees, however, have
higher salaries, and suffer injuries that may entitle them to
compensatory or punitive damages. These employees also benefit
from an unpredictable jury system, which could provide a range of
damages extending up to sizeable sums. These employees can
readily find attorneys, and can often secure large settlements with
the threat of litigation. Thus, Estreicher paints a picture of two sets of
employees: those with “rickshaws” – namely, claims too small to be
litigated – and those with “Cadillacs” – namely, suits which entitle
them to significant awards.96
Put in cost-benefit terms, Estreicher is raising the possibility
that in some cases, an employer might game the system to prevent a
claim from going to arbitration even where it might be efficient to do
so. As an example, let us suppose that an employer violates an
employee’s employment law rights, and as a result the employee
suffers an injury of $1000. The costs of litigating the dispute are
$1000, and the employee would have an 80 percent chance of success.
The costs of arbitrating the dispute would be $200, and the employee
would have a 75 percent chance of success. Doing a cost benefit
analysis, the litigation computation reaches a negative result for the
employee: (.80 * $1000) - $1000 = -$200. The arbitration result is
much better: (.75 * $1000) - $200 = $550. If we assume that the
employer has exactly the same costs, the employer would also prefer
arbitration to litigation. The expected value of litigation would be
(.80 * -$1000) - $1000 = -$1800, while the expected value of arbitration
would be (.75 * -$1000) - $200 = -$950. However, if (assuming perfect
Estreicher, supra note E1, at 558.
See id. at 563. See also Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate
Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1357 (1996) (“In short,
we have a system in which a few individuals in protected classes win a
lottery of sorts, while others queue up in the administrative agencies and
face reduced employment opportunities.”).
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information) the employer knows that the employee would lose
money by bringing the suit, the employer will not agree to
arbitration. Even though it is more efficient for both parties to
pursue arbitration, the employee will be unable to sufficiently
compensate the employer for choosing arbitration, and the employer
will sit tight and wait for the employee to go away. This result – $0 –
is obviously the best result for the employer, and it will be preferable
to the employee as compared to litigation’s $200 loss.
Assuming this situation, it would have been preferable to the
employee to have signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. In
such a case, the employer would be locked into arbitration, and
therefore could not reject the option later on. Of course, if litigation
costs were a barrier to every employment claim, the employer would
be able to sit tight on every claim, and therefore would not agree to a
pre-dispute agreement. Thus, the tradeoff that would make the predispute agreement palatable to the employer is lower exposure on
the claims that could go to litigation. Thus, the employer will have to
save costs on litigable claims – potentially through lower awards – in
order to balance out the increase in costs for nonlitigable claims. To
use Estreicher’s metaphor, if some workers are to get the chance to
trade their rickshaws for Saturns,97 others will have to trade in their
Cadillacs.
Estreicher’s argument is really a form of “reverse insurance”
discussed above, in that it takes from the few (with big claims) and
gives to the many (with small claims).98 It even has a Robin Hood
quality to it, since the “few” in his discussion are generally well-paid
employees and the “many” are lower-paid employees. As a whole,
employees may wish to exchange the possibility of a high litigation
award for a better shot at compensation for their smaller grievances.
The term “Saturn” refers to cars produced by the Saturn Corporation, a
division of General Motors that specializes in mid-priced, consumerfriendly cars. I must admit that as a former and satisfied owner of a Saturn,
this metaphor is particularly effective to me. However, Saturns have
recently received some poor marks from the trade press. See Jerry Flint, The
Rings Fall Off Saturn, Forbes.com (Jan. 1, 2003), available at:
http://www.forbes.com/home_europe/2003/01/01/cz_jf_0101flint.html.
98 I call it “reverse insurance” since insurance takes from the many and gives
to the few.
97
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However, I have several concerns with Estreicher’s theory. First, he
assumes that employees with small claims will not engage in any
strategic decisionmaking in order to get compensation. Turning back
to our example, the employer rejects post-dispute arbitration because
it knows litigation has a negative net return for the employee (-$200).
Thus, the employer assumes the employee won’t pursue her claim.
However, the employee would know that litigation also has a
negative net return for the employer – a much more significant one ($1800). Might an employee then decide to play a game of litigation
“chicken”? In other words, the employee would go forward with the
claim, even though it is a losing proposition, because she would
expect the employer to blink first and offer a settlement or agree to
arbitration. It might be a risky strategy, since it might end up with a
$200 loss, but the employee would know it was in the employer’s
best interest to settle. Even if the employer paid only $201, the
employee would be better off (by $1) and the employer would be
$1599 better off. Estreicher might argue that employees with small
claims could not even get their claims filed, since plaintiffs’ attorneys
would not be willing to sign on to this strategy. However,
employees can file charges with the EEOC for free.99 As other
commentators have pointed out, employers may be willing to settle
even baseless claims in order to avoid the costs of an EEOC
investigation and potential lawsuit.100
Second, in order for Estreicher’s model to make economic
sense for employees, there has to be some set of cases that would net
the employee a positive return in arbitration but a negative return in
litigation. If even meritless suits have value in the current system,
however, how many claims fit this category? In other words, for
how many claims is there a smaller net benefit to pursuing a strategy
of settlement and litigation rather than just dropping the suit
entirely? This question is largely an empirical one, and it depends on
(1) the cost differences between arbitration and litigation in
See Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination, available at:
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html.
100 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water,
and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PENN. J. LAB & EMP. L. 73, 8283 (1999).
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employment cases, and (2) the distribution of values for the various
employment law claims. Estreicher’s hypothesis – that a number of
low-value claims are being stymied – may be correct, but there is
insufficient data to know what this number might be. If the number
is small, then employees might end up trading in more Cadillacs
than rickshaws.
Third, Estreicher’s clever metaphor for his system masks part
of the underlying dynamic. By labeling high-value claims as
“Cadillacs,” and low-value claims as “rickshaws,” Estreicher makes
his new system of “Saturns” seem more egalitarian. But why do
some claimants have high-value claims, and others low-value claims?
One reason may be their incomes: those with higher salaries will
have greater damages for lost wages and future compensation. But
another reason may be the severity of their claim. An employee who
is fired, for example, will generally have a more significant injury,
and therefore a greater damages claim, than an employee in the same
position who was not promoted. An employee who suffered
continual and degrading sexual harassment may be entitled to
substantial compensatory and punitive damages. These employees
have higher claims for a reason: their injuries are worse. Thus, an
employee is not necessarily driving a “Cadillac” because she has a
cushy job; she may have just sustained grievous damages.101 So this
system begins to look like the previous one – taking a chunk from
those with significant claims and spreading it around to those with
small or no claims.
Finally, Estreicher’s description of arbitration results would
seem to assume that all workers would be covered by the system of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Estreicher notes that employers
do not know ahead of time who will be claimants, and therefore
should want to include all employees in the agreement.102 However,
if Estreicher is correct in assuming that well-paid employees are the
ones with the high-value claims, the employer will have an incentive
The choice of “Cadillac” has particular rhetorical effects. It symbolizes
flashy, conspicuous consumption. In his well-known description of welfare
fraud, former president Ronald Reagan described a “welfare queen” who
drove to pick up her checks in a Cadillac. See DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF
THE WELFARE QUEEN (1999).
102 See Estreicher, supra note E1, at 568.
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to get the highly-paid into arbitration and leave the poorly-paid out.
The employer has no obligation to offer the pre-dispute agreement to
everyone. So why wouldn’t the employer just offer the pre-dispute
agreement to those employees likely to have “Cadillacs”? Indeed,
one would expect different employers to have different incentives.
Those with a highly-paid, white collar workforce would have the
incentive to adopt a pre-dispute agreement, while those with a
lower-paid, less legally aware workforce would not. If this happens,
we’d be trading a Cadillac-and-rickshaw system for a Saturn-andrickshaw system.
Ultimately, I think that Estreicher’s ideas would find their
best fulfillment in a system of court-supervised arbitration or even
labor courts. Such a system would be mandatory, and thus would
not allow for the opt-out possibilities described above. It would have
a uniform set of required procedures, which would eliminate
employer opportunism in the design of the system. At the same
time, it would utilize many of the aspects of arbitration that
Estreicher finds so attractive: lower costs, quicker decisions, and
better access for poorer claimants. Such system may eventually be
created. In the meantime, it is difficult to say whether private
arbitration agreements have implemented Estreicher’s “Saturns for
rickshaws” vision .103
3. Eliminating or reducing precautionary costs.
Another
potential for ex ante efficiency gains would come from the reduction
Steven Shavell makes a variation on Estreicher’s argument by noting that
pre-dispute arbitration could be constructed to encourage more
employment-related suits by subsidizing the costs of bringing an action.
Shavell, supra note SS1, at 7. In an example, Shavell posits a manufacturing
example in which precautionary costs are trivial, but the costs of bringing a
suit are extremely high – higher, in fact, than the expected return of the suit.
Thus, the precautionary measures would not be taken since suits would be
too costly to bring. Id. at 7 n.10. A process that allowed the buyers to bring
a suit inexpensively would encourage the seller to make the inexpensive
precautions. As Shavell admits, such an ADR system would effectively
have to “encourage[] suit (for example, by subsidizing it).” Employees and
employers could create an arbitration agreement that provided cheaper
costs for employees and higher penalties against employers. As I argue
above, however, employees lack the information necessary to craft such an
agreement, and employers have no incentive to create such an agreement.
103
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of precautionary measures that an employer might take to prevent
employment law violations. As discussed earlier, Keith Hylton has
explained how the potential for litigation may induce employers to
make efforts to prevent such claims from arising in the first place.104
Such efforts involve costs. If these precautionary efforts are
sufficiently expensive, and litigation is expensive for both the
employer and employee, an employer may wish to “buy out” an
employee’s employment law rights ahead of time. In this way, the
employer can refrain from taking precautions and not worry about
litigation. The employee is satisfied because he or she has received
more, in expected value, than he or she would have from keeping the
potential causes of action.105 Steven Shavell has made a similar
point.106
Essentially, Hylton’s argument for pre-dispute agreements is
the same as his argument for pre-dispute waivers: parties may decide
that it is more efficient to agree ahead of time to bar or water down
claims rather than allow them to be litigated once they arise. As
Hylton points out, a biased arbitration agreement may serve the
same ends as a waiver – in both cases, the plaintiff is effectively
barred from pursuing compensation for her claim.107 But Hylton
does not share the same aversion to waivers as the Supreme Court.
Instead, Hylton believes that waiver agreements can enhance the
joint wealth of the parties, and therefore parties should be permitted
to waive their rights. As he notes: “The existence of a biased arbitral
forum, rather than being a sign of contract failure, may be evidence
that the parties would have chosen to enter into a waiver agreement
had that option been legally available.”108
Certainly, it is theoretically possible for two parties with
perfect information to reach efficient agreements to waive their
See Hylton, supra note H1, at 218.
See id. at 220-22.
106 As Steven Shavell noted: “It could be that, given the applicable law, too
many actions would be brought in the sense that they would absorb
resources in the form of dispute resolution costs but not produce any (or,
more generally, much) benefit in behavior. In such a case, the two sides
would elect to make an ADR agreement that reduces the frequency of
disputes.” Shavell, supra note SS1, at 7.
107 See Hylton, supra note H1, at 230.
108 Id.
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prospective disputes or subject their disputes to an arbitral forum.
However, as discussed in Part I, I have substantial doubts that
employees ever have the kind of information they would need to
make such agreements. Hylton notes that he makes “rather heroic
assumptions” regarding “the parties’ abilities to foresee events and
to calculate the costs and benefits of various decisions.”109 However,
he has greater faith in the parties’ ultimate ability to get the
information they need for these decisions. I discussed these
differences at greater length in Part I.110 Here, however, I want to
question another of his assumptions: that employers could eliminate
significant precautionary costs if allowed to waive or water down
employment law claims through arbitration.
The notion of
precautionary costs is familiar from the realm of negligence, where
Learned Hand’s famous B < PL formula dictates that negligence only
occurs when the potential for damage exceeds the costs of
precautions.111 If the burden of precautionary costs is greater that the
damage those costs are designed to prevent, then it is inefficient to
take such precautions, even if injuries result. However, negligence is
essentially the law of accidents: the injurer has no intention to injure
the victim. Employment law, on the other hand, concerns acts which
are generally intentional: discrimination, harassment, or failure to
meet some minimum standard of pay or workplace safety. What
exactly would the “precautions” be in the employment law context?
Perhaps employee monitoring, workplace training, and human
resource personnel could be considered such costs. But these are all
efforts to eliminate or mitigate intentional acts. Society understands
that a certain level of manufacturing imperfections is inevitable and
even necessary (at least in the short run), but we would prefer a
world entirely without racial or age discrimination.
Sexual
harassment is not an inevitable side-effect of productive enterprise.
Ultimately, my main concern with Hylton’s argument is his
belief that the information difficulties can be overcome. Even if they
could be overcome, however, I question whether his precautionary
costs would ever be so significant as to warrant a waiver or a biased
Id. at 226.
See supra note 81.
111 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see
also POSNER, supra note P1, at 168.
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arbitration agreement, especially given society’s distaste for
discrimination.112
4. Stronger deterrence through more accurate adjudication. The
flip side of Hylton’s “reduction of precautionary costs” argument is
that arbitration could actually heighten precautionary costs by
adjudicating certain claims more effectively. Under this scenario,
discussed by Shavell113 as well as Drahozal and Hylton,114 a predispute arbitration agreement will be efficient if (a) there is a
potential for breach of contract which will save one party money, but
make the other party worse off; (b) courts are unable to detect or
punish such breaches properly, while arbitrators can do so more
effectively; and therefore (c) without an arbitration agreement, the
receiving party will only pay the value of contract as breached (if at
all), while with an arbitration agreement, the party will be willing to
pay for the value of full performance. Under this scenario, the
parties will act more efficiently if they are able to enforce a predispute arbitration clause. Essentially, the argument is this: if parties
can create a system which will better enforce their contractual
obligations, then it is efficient to allow them to do so.115
In theory, such a situation could arise in the employment
context. For example, we would have to assume that company X
Cf.Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against,
55 STAN. L. REV. 2273 (2003).
113 Shavell, supra note SS1, at 5-6.
114 Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation
and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549,
551-61 (2003).
115 See Shavell, supra note SS1, at 5-6.
Shavell uses the example of two
parties contracting for the sale of some good or service. The value of good
performance to the buyer is $1000, while the value of substandard
performance is $500. Full performance will cost the seller $400, but
substandard performance will cost $300, saving him $100. In this example,
both parties are better off if substandard performance can be discouraged,
but the seller will engage in substandard production if the chance of getting
caught is low. If arbitrators are much better at detecting substandard
performance than courts, then both sides would be better off if they agreed
to arbitration at the onset of the agreement. And the seller would not agree
to post-dispute arbitration, since at that point it wants to avoid detection.
Id. at 6.
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could prevent employee harassment relatively cheaply, but it had no
incentive to do so because courts consistently declined to find them
guilty of harassment.116 However, X realizes that employees hate
harassment and will be more productive on the job if they are not
subjected to it. Thus, X agrees to set up a generous arbitration
agreement with savvy arbitrators who will be able to root out
harassment. This system will compel the company to take the
precautions necessary to prevent the harassment in the first place.
The hypothetical above displays one reason why the “better
deterrence” argument may be inapplicable in the employee context.
The example posited by Shavell assumes that parties will be “locked
in” to the contract and will be unable to draw on past relations.117
The threat of arbitration is necessary to compel the one party not to
shirk its contractual duties. But if the parties contemplate not one
but instead a series of contracts, then the potential shirker will choose
not to shirk in order to maintain the relationship. Similarly, in the
employment context, the employer need not construct a superresponsive arbitration system in order to create the proper
precautionary incentives. It can instead simply enact the precautions
themselves in order to retain its employees and spur them to greater
production. After all, the employer knows that if employees are
harassed, they are free to leave. Adding a level of super-arbitration
to enforce anti-harassment measures would create an unnecessary
cost.
Additionally, it seems unlikely that employees and employers
are forming these agreements in order to increase the deterrence of
statutory violations. First, if employees were eager for more
deterrence, they would presumably be the more active party in
pursuing such agreements. However, employers seem to be the ones
pushing for such agreements.118 Second, arbitrators are not likely to
be more accurate in assessing the validity of statutory claims than
We may assume that the courts do a poor job of uncovering harassment,
but the assumptions do not really change if we assume that courts just have
a restrictive definition of harassment.
117 See Shavell, supra note SS1, at 6.
118 See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Some Workers Lost Right to File Suit for Bias at
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at A1, B-6 (discussing how employers are
requiring employees to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
116
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courts. In their article on arbitration in the context of franchise
agreements, Drahozal and Hylton emphasize the benefits of having
specialized arbitrators interpret complicated or indefinite contractual
terms.119 The arbitrators employed in the collective-bargaining
context are also thought to possess insight and experience that enable
them to better manage disputes between unions and employers.120
However, in both cases the arbitrator is interpreting (and, over time,
reinterpreting) provisions of a particular contract.121 In the nonunion setting, however, arbitrators are instead primarily called upon
to interpret statutes, regulations, and other provisions of law.
Arbitrators do not have the same type of information advantage over
the law that they do over a particular contract. In fact, one frequent
criticism of non-union employment arbitration is that arbitrators do
not properly apply the law.122 The lack of published arbitral opinions
makes arbitration outcomes even more uncertain.
Overall,
arbitration would seem to be a less certain route for enforcement,
which decreases, not increases, efficiency.123 Third, as I discussed
earlier, even if it is possible, as Estreicher argues, that arbitration
increases the number of claims brought against the employer, those

Drahozal & Hylton, supra note DH1, at 558.
See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a
grievance [as an arbitrator], because he cannot be similarly informed.”).
121 Even when such arbitrators are determining whether an employee was
fired for discriminatory motives, they are determining whether the
contractual for-cause provisions have been violated, rather than whether
Title VII has been violated. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson,
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment
Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1205
(1993) (“The arbitrator at all times . . . is interpreting and applying the
contract.”).
122 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (1997) (noting
that “the competence of arbitrators to analyze and decide purely legal issues
in connection with statutory claims has been questioned”).
123 See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note DH1, at 559 (“Indeed, arbitration may
reduce the deterrence benefit if the parties are uncertain as to how the
arbitral forum will interpret contractual terms.”).
119
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claims would be smaller and would not necessarily increase the
deterrence of prohibited activity.
5. Economies of scale. Another potential justification for a predispute agreement could be an economies-of-scale argument.
Developing a system of arbitration incurs costs. The employer must
first decide whether it would prefer arbitration to litigation – a
decision that should require some information gathering and
processing. Then, the system must be developed: the procedural
rules, the potential pool of arbitrators, the locations for the
arbitrations, and many other details. Generally such development
will require the assistance of counsel. Then, once the system has
been constructed, the employer must establish some method of
administering its processes. Employees must perform such duties of
accepting forms, arranging pre-arbitration meetings, and
maintaining the arbitrator pool, or an outside agency must be paid to
do these things. In many ways, the employer is responsible for
creating and maintaining its own system of justice, and must provide
many of the services that public employees provide in the court
system.
It would be difficult for an employer to develop such a
system after a dispute has arisen. The employer would have to pour
resources into a potential arbitration system while at the same time
pursuing litigation. Under the pre-dispute system, the employer
knows that resources devoted to developing the arbitration system
will be fruitfully spent. In addition, each employee might have his or
her own set of requirements before agreeing to the arbitration. Since
each employee would have veto power over the arbitration, the
parties might spend a good deal of time haggling over the details.
Moreover, if only a few employees eventually opted to choose
arbitration, the employer could not spread its costs over a large pool
of disputes. It might not make economic sense for an employer to
provide for arbitration if it cannot guarantee that all its disputes will
be funneled through that system.124
There are two potential responses to this economies-of-scale
difficulty. First, an employer could develop a system of arbitration
See Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note E2, at 1358-59 (arguing
that a dispute-resolution system is a public good which must be provided
on a collective basis to be cost-effective).
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but only ask employees to agree to it after the dispute has arisen. As
noted in Part I, if arbitration is more economically efficient than
litigation, the parties will bargain and ultimately agree to it. The
employee might require some form of compensation in return for
agreeing to the arbitration, but the employer could provide the
compensation and still be better off. Nothing prevents an employer
from developing an efficient system of arbitration and proposing its
use after the dispute has arisen. Second, the costs of developing an
arbitration system may be going down, as more groups provide “offthe-rack” arbitration processes. It may be easier and less expensive
for an employer to simply sign on with a group like the American
Arbitration Association and adopts its rules, procedures, and pool of
arbitrators. Employees and their representatives are also more likely
to know about a system developed by a national organization, and
may therefore be less concerned about the fairness of the
proceedings. Commentators have also proposed their own versions
of a uniform or model arbitration procedure for parties to use.125
These developments are all likely to reduce the costs required in
developing an arbitral system.
Nevertheless, employers may be hesitant to invest any funds
in an arbitral system which employees will not embrace. It is
possible that employees could reject arbitration even if it is their
economic best interest. This possibility is discussed below.
B. Prevention of Irrational Post-Dispute Arbitration Rejection
A number of commentators argue that parties will never
agree to post-dispute arbitration because plaintiffs and defendants
have different sets of incentives.126 One forum will always have
advantages for one side that are disadvantages for the other.
However, as discussed above, economic theory teaches that the
parties will not be stuck with the default option if another option is
more efficient. Instead, the parties will bargain to reach the most
efficient alternative. Thus, if the employee would prefer litigation,
but the employer would choose arbitration, the parties would
bargain to reach the most efficient result. If arbitration is more
efficient, the employer will provide some incentive for the employee
125
126

See, e.g., Sherwyn, Tracey & Eigen, supra note S1, at 125-28.
See, e.g., Sherwyn, supra note S2, at 37.
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to agree to it; if litigation is more efficient, the employee will reject
the employer’s offer and stay with the default setting.127
Of course, not all transactions operate as smoothly in practice
as they do in theory. Part I described why pre-dispute arbitration
agreements may have trouble meeting the “perfect information”
requirement of the Coase Theorem. Post-dispute agreements are less
complicated, and the necessary information is more attainable.
However, informational problems could also arise in the postdispute context. For example, employees and their representatives
could overestimate the degree of employer bias that arbitrators
would exhibit, leading them to undervalue the arbitration option. Or
employers might overestimate their chances of success before a jury,
leading them to overvalue litigation. Looking at all the factors, the
parties could have less that perfect information about the probability
of success in each forum (Pl and Pa), the likely relief granted in each
forum (Rl and Ra), and the costs of litigating in each forum (Cl and
Ca). In fact, parties will most certainly lack perfect information about
these factors. If both parties had perfect information about Pl, Rl, and
Cl, they would be able to settle every time.
Of course, as noted in Part I, a large percentage of cases do
settle. And the information available at the post-dispute stage is
certainly better than the information at the pre-dispute stage.
Nevertheless, if parties routinely either lack the appropriate
information or make false assumptions about that information, they
may routinely make inefficient decisions. In the employment
context, parties may routinely make inefficient decisions not to
choose post-dispute arbitration based on either a lack of data or
misinformation about arbitration and litigation. If, in fact, choosing
arbitration is always or generally the most efficient option, then predispute arbitration agreements may in fact lead to more efficient
results. The parties might be choosing the most efficient result in the
dark, but they would be getting there nonetheless.

Thus, it is insufficient to simply assert that post-dispute arbitration
agreements will never take place because one side will always prefer
litigation to arbitration. See, e.g., Sherwyn, supra note S2, at 63. Both parties
may begin with different preferences, but if they have perfect information,
they will eventually reach a bargain to use the most efficient forum.
127
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What might lead parties to reject post-dispute arbitration
inefficiently? One plausible story is that employees and their
attorneys overestimate their likelihood of success in litigation and
underestimate their likelihood of success before an arbitrator. Such
misperceptions could be based on several factors. First, employees
and their representatives might lack information about the arbitral
process. Arbitration is a private form of dispute resolution, and the
results are generally kept between the parties. “Hard” data, such as
information about an arbitrator’s record of adjudication, or “soft”
data, such as information about the arbitrator’s personal quirks and
biases, may be hard to find or unavailable. In the absence of
information, employees and their representatives might conclude
that arbitration is more employer-friendly than it actually is. And
they therefore would demand a higher price to accept it – a price that
the employer would find inefficient.
Second, employees and their representatives might be subject
to some of the decisionmaking heuristics described in Part I. For
example, employees might suffer from optimism bias in perceiving
their likelihood of success in litigation. They might focus on the
likelihood that they will win the maximum amount of damages at
trial, and irrationally discount their likelihood of failure, as well as
the costs of trial. Just as employees can be overly optimistic about
their likelihood of termination, they can be overly optimistic about
their likelihood of litigation success. Moreover, parties may be
subject to the “self-serving” bias, a term for the tendency of parties to
interpret facts and events in a way to confirm their pre-existing
beliefs.128 This bias leads to a divergence between plaintiffs and
defendants over the likelihood of the claim’s success.129 This bias
could lead to plaintiffs overvaluing their chance of success in
litigation, thereby skewing the results of their comparison with
arbitration.130
See infra Part I.C.2.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note KU1, at 1094 (“Evidence of the selfserving bias in the analysis of lawsuits suggests . . . that plaintiffs (and
defendants) will systematically anticipate their trial prospects as being
better than defendants (and plaintiffs) believe.”).
130 Plaintiffs might also overvalue their chance of success at arbitration, but
the upside of litigation is generally seen to be higher. See Estreicher, supra
128
129
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In addition, the behavioral characteristic known as the
“endowment effect” might affect employee perceptions.
The
endowment effect refers to the psychological phenomenon in which
individuals value what they have more than what they do not have.
In a famous131 experiment, researchers gave half of the participants a
mug.132 The researchers then independently asked those with the
mug how much money they would want for it, and asked those
without the mug how much they would pay for it. Those with the
mugs wanted significantly more for the mugs than the others were
willing to pay for the mugs.133 The researchers concluded that there
was an endowment effect – namely, people valued the mug that they
had more than the mug that they did not. In other words, people
will require more money to part with something than they would
pay to get it in the first place.134
The endowment effect causes problems for economic theory,
because economics assumes that a person’s utility for a certain good
or status does not vary based on context. The Coase theorem is
based on the premise that parties will bargain to reach the most
efficient result – no matter which party is endowed with the initial
legal entitlement. However, if people value a good or entitlement
more highly simply because they possess it, such entitlements will be
“stickier” than economic theory would predict.
The initial
assignment of the good or right may be more difficult to bargain
about, because the holder will be less willing to part with it.135 In
note E1, at 563 (discussing high litigation prospects as “Cadillacs” and
arbitration prospects as “Saturns”).
131 Now infamous?
132 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
133 Over the course of four iterations of this study, buyers were willing to
pay a median of between $2.25 and $2.50 for the mug, while sellers were
willing to part with the mug for a median of $5.25.
134 Numerous other experiments, some conducted outside the laboratory,
have found similar evidence of the endowment effect. See Russell Korobkin,
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232-35
(2003).
135 One unresolved question is whether the increase in utility that
apparently flows from having an entitlement should be counted as true
utility. In other words, if I would pay $2.50 to buy the mug, but would
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such a manner could the endowment effect complicate our model for
post-dispute arbitration agreements. Employees are “endowed”
with the right to take their case to court. Thus, when asked to choose
between arbitration and litigation, employees may place a higher
value on litigation, since they have the right in hand. The
endowment effect complicates our expectation that employers and
employees will be able to bargain to reach the most efficient result.
The lack of information, coupled with potential behavioral
tendencies, may dampen or completely quash efforts by parties to
reach post-dispute arbitration agreements.
Particularly when
combined with the start-up costs necessary to arbitrate, these factors
may lead to litigation when arbitration would have been the more
efficient result. Although we do not know how many parties agree
to post-dispute arbitration, limited studies and anecdotal evidence
indicate that such agreements are rare in the employment context.136
However, if there are in fact only a small number of parties that agree
to arbitration after a dispute has arisen, there are several possible
explanations for this. First, the parties might be acting efficiently:
arbitration might not provide the cost savings that its proponents
proclaim. Second, the start-up costs may be too high for parties to
pursue arbitration on an ad hoc, post-dispute basis. Third, parties
might lack the information to properly evaluate the post-dispute
arbitration possibilities, and they may make improper assumptions
about the costs and benefits of arbitration and litigation. Finally, the
parties could be irrationally rejecting arbitration based on behavioral
heuristics.
require $5.25 to part with it, is the mug worth $2.50 or $5.25 to me, in terms
of utility? This problem is not as important in the litigation-arbitration
context, since both litigation and arbitration are simply means to an end and
not intrinsically valuable. However, plaintiffs may put a value on having
“their day in court” which could be exacerbated by the endowment effect.
136 David Sherwyn studied the arbitration program available through the
Illinois Human Rights Commission from 1994 to 1998. Although the
Commission did not keep precise records of the number of parties using the
arbitration program, Sherwyn surmised (using available records and
anecdotal evidence) that somewhere between zero and one percent of the
claims filed with the IHRC went to arbitration. See Sherwyn, supra note S2,
at 62. A similarly small number used the IHRC’s mediation program. See
also Estreicher, supra note E1, at 567.
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Although it is impossible to know at this point why postdispute agreements are rare in the employment context, one potential
reason – a lack of information about arbitration – may not be a longterm impediment. As noted in Part I.A, the information necessary to
evaluate a post-dispute arbitration agreement is the type of
information that attorneys must evaluate all the time. Certainly, not
every case settles, but attorneys must constantly assess the P, R and C
of litigation to determine when and at which price it makes sense to
settle. Currently, it is harder to determine the P, R and C of
arbitration. Arbitrations are generally private, and parties can create
their own unique systems, making comparisons difficult. However,
as organizations like the American Arbitration Association become
more popular, arbitration processes and procedures will become
more of a known quantity.137
Moreover, these groups are
endeavoring to provide more information about the results of
arbitrations (in redacted form), so that evaluations of arbitrators
themselves can be made.138 As arbitration becomes a more popular
option, more information will be available, the process will have
greater transparency, and parties will be able to make better
decisions.139
Moreover, there is reason to doubt that behavioral heuristics
are leading to a significant number of inefficient decisions in the
See, e.g., JAMS Guide to Dispute Resolution for Employment Programs
and
Sample
Clause
Language,
available
at:
http://www.jamsadr.com/employment_clauses.asp;
138 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association's Employment Awards
Database, available at: http://www.adr.org/AAAAwards/ (containing
redacted awards from employment cases, but available only to members).
139 Of course, one reason arbitration may become more popular is the
increasing number of pre-dispute agreements. In the absence of pre-dispute
agreements, the initial costs of developing and popularizing a post-dispute
arbitration might have been prohibitive. Thus, there is something of a “path
dependence” to litigation: because litigation is (currently) the societallycreated option, more people use it, and there is more information generated
about it than any potentially more efficient alternative. For more on path
dependence, see PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY (1994). But see Stan
Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Policy and Path Dependence: From QWERTY
(1995),
available
at:
to
Windows
95,
18
REGULATION
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg18n3d.html.
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post-dispute context. Certainly, the optimism bias might work its
effects on individual plaintiffs, and the endowment effect might lead
to a plaintiff preference for litigation. However, in the context of
most post-dispute situations, the employee-plaintiff will have the
advice of counsel. Attorneys are regular and repeat market
participants. Unlike occasional participants, who fall back on
heuristics to deal with uncertain and unfamiliar decisions, attorneys
must make rational calculations in order to be successful in their
practice. In the pre-dispute context, the employee generally will not
have the advice of counsel. Without such assistance, the employee is
more likely to fall back onto heuristics in making a decision.
Attorneys are certainly subject to the optimism bias, the selfserving bias, and the endowment effect, and they might therefore
demand too high a price for agreeing to post-dispute arbitration.
However, these biases also affect attorneys’ decisions to settle cases.
Thus, decisions not to go to arbitration should be no more
systematically inefficient than decisions not to settle. If there are any
particular inefficiencies in the post-dispute arbitration context, I
would suspect they stem from attorney prejudices about arbitration
based on lack of information. One would not be surprised to find
plaintiffs’ attorneys suspicious of arbitration agreements. In fact, a
recent survey of Chicago employment attorneys found that both
plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys thought arbitrators were biased in
favor of the other side.140 There are, of course, a number of
explanations for this data: one side is wrong; one side is lying; both
sides are overly pessimistic. But both sides might also be ignorant.
We distrust what we do not understand. As I will discuss further in
Part III, courts and legislatures could take steps to eliminate some of
the potential inefficiencies caused by a lack of information. But as I
noted earlier, I do not think this problem is as severe, in terms of its
efficiency consequences, as the information problem in the predispute context.
C. Reduction of Societal Externalities (or, Greater Societal Efficiency)
A third potential argument for pre-dispute arbitration
agreements is that they reduce externalities caused by litigation and
See Sherwyn, supra note S2, at 42. Both groups of attorneys agreed,
however, that judges favor employers and juries favor employees. Id.
140
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thereby increase societal efficiency. Below I discuss two versions of
this argument: (1) pre-dispute agreements increase efficiency by
watering down employment law claims, and (2) pre-dispute
agreements increase efficiency by reducing societal litigation costs.
1. Diluting employment law claims. Thus far we have assumed
that it is efficient for employees to have the legal protections they are
entitled to. If employment law claims represent a net societal
inefficiency, however, then societal efficiency would be improved by
diminishing or eliminating these claims. For example, if Title VII
claims ultimately end up costing society more than they create in
benefits, then society would be better off if Title VII claims were
eliminated. The most direct way to do this, of course, would be
repealing Title VII. But less direct methods could also have an effect.
If, as critics claim, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are a way for
employers to elude some of their Title VII liability, then such
agreements are a method for diluting the inefficient effects of Title
VII. The more biased the agreement, the better. By effectively acting
as a waiver, biased pre-dispute agreements could dilute or eliminate
employment law liability and thereby improve societal efficiency.
Although I have not found any proponents of pre-dispute
arbitration who make the previous claim, one criticism of the current
system of employment law litigation has been that the system is
biased against employers and too permissive towards frivolous
suits.141 If the system is too corrupt, it would arguably be inefficient
to maintain it. However, certainly no courts have justified preFor example, David Sherwyn chastises critics of pre-dispute arbitration
who support the current system of litigation.
These critics do not, however, even acknowledge that the
current system may be unjust. They do not discuss the fact
that merit is not the driving force in determining the
resolution of a case. They do not mention that high cost of
defense associated with litigation results in incidences of
"de facto severance" and other forms of systemic leveraging
to extort settlement for claims with no merit. These
individuals may not care about employers' costs of defense
or the fact that arbitration reduces incidence of "de facto
severance" and other forms of systemic leveraging to extort
settlement for claims with no merit.
Sherwyn, supra note S2, at 66.
141
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dispute arbitration on this basis; if anything, courts have stressed that
arbitration should have little or no effect on the underlying
resolution of employment law claims.142 Because this subject is
beyond the scope of this analysis, I will leave it for other
commentators.143
2. Reducing societal litigation costs. Our model for pre- and
post-dispute arbitration agreements has focused solely on the
employee and the employer. And we have declared an agreement to
be efficient if it maximizes the utility of the two parties. However,
we have not taken into account whether the two parties might create
external costs that would lead to greater societal inefficiency but
would be ignored by the parties themselves. In other words, do
decisions to arbitrate or litigate create societal externalities? And do
pre-dispute arbitration agreements reduce or increase the incidence
or significance of these externalities?
The most obvious externality created by a decision to litigate
is the costs of running the judicial system. Although parties are
obliged to pay filing fees, these minimal fees do not cover the costs of
running the judicial system.
Judges, clerks, court clerks,
administrative staff, security personnel, and building maintenance
staff must all be paid.144 Building construction or rental costs are
incurred, as are costs for office supplies, computer systems, and the

See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (“[F]ederal
statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements . . . because the
agreement only determines the choice of forum.”); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) ("By agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum." (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
143 For more on this issue, see John Donahue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 1411 (1986), and Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title
VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987).
144 In 2002, Congress allocated a budget of $4.6 billion to the federal
judiciary. See Leonidas Ralph Meacham, Annual Report of the Director,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 8 (2002), available at:
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrpt02/2002.pdf.
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other standard necessities for a white-collar workplace.145 Juries
must be selected and paid. The court systems (and thereby the
taxpayers) absorb most of these costs,146 minus the small amount they
receives in fees. These costs represent a significant additional set of
burdens that society must shoulder in order to maintain the
availability of litigation. If the parties choose arbitration, then the
parties pay for these costs. Since the parties need not worry about
the societal costs of litigation, they are apt to ignore them – creating
an externality.
By way of example, let us go back to our post-dispute model.
As we noted, each party will choose arbitration over litigation if:
Pa*Ra – Ca > Pl*Rl - Cl
For purposes of making a simple example, let’s assume that the
employee has a 70 percent chance of winning $10,000 both in
litigation and arbitration. In arbitration, the costs would be $500 for
each party; however, in litigation they would be $400. Since the costs
of litigation are higher than the costs of arbitration for each party, the
parties would both choose litigation over arbitration.147
However, this model leaves out an important variable: the
costs of litigation to society. Up until this point, all costs in our
model have been absorbed by the employee and the employer. Thus,
what was efficient for them jointly has been efficient for society as a
whole. But the parties do not have to absorb all of the costs of
litigating a case, and therefore may not take them into account when
deciding on the most efficient option. As noted above, the parties
would ultimately make their choice based on what is most efficient
between them, represented by this equation:
Pa*Ra – JCa > Pl*Rl - JCl

Since 1985 Congress has appropriated more than $5 billion for
courthouse construction. See id. at 2.
146 Individual jurors also absorb costs – namely, the opportunity costs of
whatever they would have done if they had not been selected for jury duty.
147 (.70 * $10,000) – $500 = $6500 < (.70 * $10000) - $400 = $6600.
145
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JC is the joint costs of both parties.148 However, from society’s
standpoint, arbitration would be more efficient than litigation when
this equation is satisfied:
Pa*Ra – JCa > Pl*Rl – JCl – SCl
In this equation, SCl represents the social costs of litigation. If SCl is
greater than zero, then there may be some cases in which the parties
will choose litigation even when, from society’s perspective, it would
be more efficient for the parties to choose arbitration. Going back to
our example above, let’s assume that if the parties took the case to
court, the court system would incur a cost of another $500 processing
the case and administering the trial.149 If we add up the costs to both
parties as well as to the court system, arbitration clearly is more
efficient. 150 However, the parties do not absorb these costs, and
therefore would choose litigation. Their choice would be efficient as
between the two of them, but inefficient from a societal viewpoint.
Perhaps a view to societal efficiency is one reason many
courts have been eager to uphold pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
After all, courts know better than anyone else the societal costs that
litigation incurs.151 Instead of imagining yourself as an employee,
imagine yourself as a federal judge. You know your docket has a
substantial number of employment-related cases. These cases often
revolve around questions of fact rather than questions of law, and the
stakes are small compared with heady constitutional questions or

As noted above in Part I.A, the parties will bargain to choose the most
efficient result, even if the parties have differing expenses for each process.
149 This $1000 figure represents the expected cost of the litigation, since we
would know ahead of time whether the case would get to trial.
150 Arbitration’s total costs would be $500 + $500 = $1000. Litigation’s total
costs would be $400 + $400 + $500 = $1300.
151 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
237 (1996) (“One substitute for federal judicial services is arbitration, so it is
not surprising that the federal courts have become increasingly hospitable to
arbitration.”); Cole, supra note RC1, at 449 (“Taking the task into their own
hands, judges, in an attempt to reduce their workload without increasing
costs or delays, have embraced arbitration as an alternate means for
resolving disputes.”).
148
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complex business transactions.152 Along comes a new avenue for
these claims – a method of dispute resolution that is familiar to
judges from the union context.153 The parties – or often just the
employer – absorb most of the costs of this new system.154
Theoretically, this system could be a cheaper and more accurate
method of resolving difficult employment dispute, and the costs are
borne directly by the litigants. From an efficiency (as well as an
institutional) perspective, pre-dispute agreements would seem fairly
attractive.
Of course, litigation costs are not purely deadweight. Most of
the benefits from litigation are ex ante, in that the potential for
litigation deters parties from engaging in illegal conduct. If an
arbitration system failed to enforce a party’s rights in the same
manner as the judicial system, society would lose efficiency as illegal
behavior increased. Just as the costs of litigation are compared with
the costs of arbitration, the deterrence effects of litigation must be
balanced against the deterrence effects of arbitration. If arbitration is
too biased toward employers, such that employers feel more free to
engage in prohibited activities or reduce their precautionary
measures, societal costs from increased illegal activity will increase –
and may overtake the institutional cost savings.155 Thus, if courts
were attracted to arbitration as a method of increasing social

See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 293, 306 (“These [cases
founded on employment disputes] are often tedious cases, involving angry
parties and mostly fact-bound disagreements. It is not the kind of litigation
that most judges prefer to manage.”).
153 Arbitration has long been a staple in the union context, and the Supreme
Court has long upheld wide powers for arbitrators in the collective
bargaining context. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Co., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960) (together known as the Steelworkers Trilogy).
154 An important issue in pre-dispute arbitration agreements is whether the
employer must bear the costs of the arbitration. See discussion infra.
155 Cf. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003)
(noting that certain types of provisions may “undermine[] the deterrent
effect of the anti-discrimination statutes”).
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efficiency, they would need to maintain a level of fairness for the
arbitral process sufficient to keep a proper level of deterrence.
Some commentators have pointed to another potential cost of
arbitration – the loss of judicial decisions on critical issues in the law.
Arbitration agreements often keep the results of any particular
arbitration a secret. Not all agreements require written decisions; for
those that do, the parties may place restrictions on their ability to
publicize such opinions. As more disputes are diverted into
arbitration, there will be fewer litigated cases, and thus fewer
published decisions. The end result will be a sparser and poorer
legal landscape, where statutory rights remain stagnant and the law
does not adapt to societal change.156 It is difficult to measure the
costs and benefits from judicial decisions at a societal level.
Certainly, such decisions have important benefits – they provide
further explication and development of the law. Law without
written opinions would be hard to fathom. And many of the
employment laws – particularly the Americans with Disabilities Act
– are relatively new and require a great deal of judicial exegesis.
However, judicial decisions also have costs, for both the parties and
society. Settlement is generally considered the most efficient way of
resolving a dispute. There may be some ratio of societal disputes to
judicial opinions that maintains the optimal level of growth in the
law, but I know of no research that has attempted to generate such a
number. Moreover, the law would continue to develop even under a
system where pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforced. Not
all employers or employees will enter into pre-dispute agreements.
The EEOC can still bring suits on behalf of individual employees to
assert their federal employment law rights, even if those employees
are covered by an arbitration agreement.157 Through its claim intake
process, the EEOC can select those cases which raise novel issues of
law and insure that the issues receive a judicial hearing.158 Finally, if
these mitigating factors are deemed insufficient, society could permit

See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1086-87 (1984).
See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).
158 See Estreicher, supra note E2, at 1356 (noting that greater use of arbitration
by individual employees frees up administrative agencies to pursue
systemic litigation).
156
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courts to review arbitration decisions that concerned novel issues of
law.159
Ultimately, I think the issue of societal efficiency presents the
most persuasive argument for pre-dispute arbitration. By enforcing
pre-dispute agreements, the courts have overseen the creation of a
new system of dispute resolution paid for by the parties themselves.
If the arbitral forum is truly as fair as its proponents submit, then
society gets a cheaper form of adjudication without any
corresponding loss in deterrence. Of course, whether pre-dispute
agreements are generally fair is a subject still open to investigation.
Given the potential for employer opportunism, I would hesitate to
suggest such agreements are fair without substantial evidence.
III: THOUGHTS ON THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEBATE
Critics of predispute arbitration agreements generally focus
on the potential for unfair arbitration procedures in their attacks. In
some situations, unfair procedures stack the deck against employees:
employees may have drastically shortened statutes of limitation; they
may have to provide discovery from which the employer is exempt;
employers may control the choice of arbitrators or the pool of
potential arbitrators; and employers may provide themselves with
rights of notice or appeal not provided to employees.160 Even with
fair procedures, arbitration may arguably be titled against employees
if the arbitrators themselves are biased.
According to some
commentators, the repeat-player effect enables employers to have
more familiarity with arbitrators,161 and that arbitrators may
For a suggestion in this regard, see Monica J. Washington, Note,
Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review
without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844 (1999).
160 An arbitration agreement required by Hooters of America contained all
of these. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th
Cir. 1999).
161 See, e.g., Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC
L. REV . 693, 714 (1993) ("[S]ince employers rather than individual
employees are more likely to have repeat participation in the employment
dispute arbitration process, arbitrators are more likely to rule in their favor
in order to increase their chances of being selected to arbitrate future
159
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consciously or unconsciously favor employers since employers
administer and often pay for the arbitration system.162
Now that the Supreme Court has made clear that the FAA’s
provisions apply to almost all employees,163 state and lower federal
courts have set about the task of defining the limits of acceptable
arbitration procedures. But a fundamental question remains: how is
that debate to be framed? Will it be framed primarily by contract
law, which focuses primarily on the voluntary agreement between
the two parties? Or will courts find that arbitration procedures must
have a certain level of procedural fairness in order to protect the
deterrent and remedial purposes of the underlying statutes? The
Supreme Court’s Gilmer decision provides support for both
perspectives. On the one hand, Gilmer cites the FAA for the
proposition that arbitration agreements should be enforced “save
upon such grounds as exist . . . for the revocation of any contract.”164
The Court noted that “fraud or overwhelming economic power” may
justify contractual revocation but found such doctrines were not
present in that case.165 On the other hand, Gilmer also makes clear
that arbitration is only permissible if a party does not lose any
substantive rights as a result of the agreement.166 The Court appears
to require as a condition of arbitration that the “prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum.”167 In this context the Court reviewed several
procedural provisions in the arbitration agreement, such as the
claims."); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of
Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 656 (same); Alleyne, supra note
RA1, at 426 (noting temptation for arbitrators to favor institutional
employer interests).
162 See Cole, supra note RC1, at 478.
163 The Court interpreted the FAA to exclude on workers directly involved
in interstate transportation. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
119 (2001).
164 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
165 Id. at 33.
166 See id. at 26 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” (quoting Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 628)).
167 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
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selection of arbitrators and limitations on discovery and class actions,
and held that there had been “no showing” that such procedures
“will prove insufficient” for the vindication of the statutory claims.168
As one circuit court noted, this approach is necessary to prevent
unfair agreements that “would enable employers to evade the
requirements of federal law altogether.”169
In a recent case
concerning consumer arbitration, the Supreme Court discussed both
perspectives as a joint test: “In determining whether statutory claims
may be arbitrated, we first ask whether the parties agreed to submit
their claims to arbitration, and then ask whether Congress has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue.”170
State and federal courts have considered both of these
approaches in reviewing pre-dispute employment arbitration
agreements. In striking down arbitration agreements on contractual
grounds, California and the Ninth Circuit (interpreting California
law) have relied on the doctrine of unconscionability.171 In the
Hooters case, the Fourth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement
violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing.172 Some courts have
discussed the doctrines of consideration and mutuality of
obligation.173
However, courts have also looked to whether
Id. at 30-32.
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003).
170 Green Tree Financial Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
171 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 2329 (2002); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6
P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). Other courts have also discussed unconscionability in
the context of employment arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding thirty-day time
limit, restrictions on relief, and a “loser pays” provision to be
unconscionable); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666-67
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding the agreement not to be unconscionable); Wilcox v.
Valero Refining Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding the
application of an arbitration agreement to conduct which happened before
the agreement to be unconscionable).
172 Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
173 See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 667-68; Harris v. Green Tree Financial
Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); Faber v. Menard, 267 F.Supp.2d 961, 972
(N.D. Iowa 2003).
168
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arbitration procedures are sufficiently fair to vindicate the
underlying substantive rights. For example, the D.C. Circuit in Cole
v. Burns Int’l Sec. Services174 upheld an arbitration agreement based on
the procedural fairness of the agreement. The court set forth five
procedural requirements for arbitral agreements and found that
these procedures had been met in the instant case.175 Other courts
have employed a similar “effect-on-substantive-rights” analysis in
reviewing certain arbitral procedures.176
One procedural issue which has been analyzed under both
contractual and substantive-rights approaches is the cost-splitting
provision in some arbitration agreements. Since the parties are
paying for the entire costs of arbitration, those costs may reach
significant levels. Although some employers offer to pay for the bulk
of arbitration costs in their arbitration agreements, other employers
require that the costs of arbitration be split between the parties. In its
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. –Alabama v. Randolph,177 the
Supreme Court focused primarily on the substantive-rights analysis,
recognizing that “the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal
105 F.3d 1465, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
For example, the court in Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1997) upheld an arbitration agreement based on the procedural
fairness of the agreement. The court noted:
We believe that all of the factors addressed in Gilmer are
satisfied here. In particular, we note that the arbitration
arrangement (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2)
provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a
written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that
would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not
require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any
arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the
arbitration forum. Thus, an employee who is made to use
arbitration as a condition of employment “effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum.”
Id. at 1482.
176 See, e.g., Musnick v, King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003);
DeOrnellas v. Aspen Sq. Mgmt., 295 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
177 531 U.S. 79 (2000). Green Tree concerned consumer, rather than
employment, arbitration.
174
175
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statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”178 However, the Court was
unwilling to say that the possibility of such preclusion was enough to
impair substantive rights.179 Ultimately, the Court adopted a caseby-case approach to this issue, holding that parties bear the burden
of establishing that costs will be prohibitive.180
Lower courts have differed over whether such cost-splitting
arrangements are generally enforceable. Some courts have held such
agreements unenforceable on contractual grounds. The Ninth
Circuit has held cost-splitting arrangements to be substantively
unconscionable.181 Most courts, however, have followed Randolph’s
lead and analyzed such arrangements as a substantive rights issue.
Prior to Randolph, some courts had suggested that cost splitting
arrangements were per se unenforceable.182 After Randolph, courts
have adopted the Court’s case-by-case approach, asking claimants to
prove that the costs of arbitration are “so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims.”183
However, courts have taken different
positions as to what kind of costs deter claims.184 One school of
Id. at 90. The Court resolved the contract issue in a brief sentence. See id.
(“In this case, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate all claims
relating to their contract, including claims involving statutory rights.”).
179 Id. at 90-91.
180 Id. at 92 (“Similarly, we believe that where, as here, a party seeks to
invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the
likelihood of incurring such costs.”).
181 See Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that “a fee allocation scheme which requires the
employee to split the arbitrator's fees with the employer would alone render
an arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable”).
182 See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Col., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235
(10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062
(11th Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
183 Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th
Cir. 2001).
184 For a discussion of these positions in terms of the “forum selection”
school versus the “comparative cost of litigation” school, see Michael H.
Leroy & Peter Feuille, When is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute
Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50
UCLA L. REV. 143, 180-89 (2002).
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thought has held that any costs above and beyond what would have
been assessed as court costs and filing fees deters such claims and
therefore affects substantive rights.185 Another approach favors an
analysis of whether the costs are actually high enough to deter the
bringing of claims. In this regard, the Sixth Circuit asks whether
costs are potentially high enough to chill a class of potential
litigants.186 The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, inquires into
whether the actual arbitral costs in a particular instance prevent the
particular litigant from having an adequate and accessible substitute
forum.187 These fractured approaches have led to divergent results.
An empirical study of reported cases on the issue found that
appellate courts ordered arbitration in only half of the cases in which
claimants contested cost-splitting arrangements.188
The framing of the analysis concerning these procedural
issues will have a profound effect on how these issues are
determined. If they are scrutinized under the lens of contract law,
the primary issue will be whether these parties reached a free and
voluntary agreement to arbitrate under the specified circumstances.
If they are examined for their effects on substantive rights, the issue
becomes the actual impact of the particular procedure on the
See Armendariz, 3 P.3d at 765 (“Accordingly, consistent with the majority
of jurisdictions to consider this issue, we conclude that when an employer
imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the
arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the
employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be
required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.”).
186 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003). The
court noted that an inquiry into the typical “job description and
socioeconomic background” of potential litigant should be undertaken. Id.
187 See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556 (“We believe that the appropriate inquiry is
one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an
adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis
that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the
arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration
and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as
to deter the bringing of claims.”).
188 See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 178, at 177. However, district courts
ordered arbitration in 77 percent of cases in which cost was raised as an
issue. Id.
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underlying arbitration. There are reductive perils to either approach.
If the parties have in fact both agreed to the arbitration contract, the
effects of the actual procedures – no matter how draconian – would
appear meaningless. On the other hand, arbitral procedures of
necessity have an impact on the underlying adjudication; in fact, the
parties have theoretically chosen arbitration to take advantage of
those procedures. Thus, the question of “effect” is too simple.
Determining whether a particular procedure has a certain level of
effect on substantive rights – “substantial” effect, perhaps, or
“preclusive” effect – is an exercise that is ultimately more about a
court’s view on the merits of arbitration.
My hope is that the model provided in Part I will provide a
new basis for courts and commentators to analyze the contractual
issues surrounding pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
The
complexity of the model calls into question whether such agreements
are based on adequate cost-benefit analyses. Instead, it seems likely
that employees cannot make such analyses and instead fall back onto
decisionmaking heuristics in agreeing to arbitration. Thus, the fact
that both parties have “agreed” to the provision does not mean both
parties have arrived at a meaningful decision that the provision will
make them better off. Once this uncertainty has been acknowledged,
we may then move to the next round of scrutiny: whether such
agreements should be enforced. As mentioned earlier, imperfections
in the bargaining process do not require that a contract be held
unenforceable. However, the information gap in the pre-dispute
context provides a significant reason for subjecting pre-dispute
agreements to an unconscionability analysis. Interestingly, courts
which find such agreements to be unconscionable have not focused
on the information gap, relying instead on such concepts as “unequal
bargaining power” and “contracts of adhesion.”189 A deeper
understanding of the information gap would make these terms less
of a place-holder and provide stronger grounds for a finding of
unconscionability. 190
Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003);
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir.
2002);
190 Cf. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206-07 (2002). Korobkin suggests
189
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Moreover, the existence of the information gap points to two
directions for future reforms of the arbitration process. One direction
would involve greater scrutiny by courts of the terms of each
agreement for its procedural fairness. As noted above, this type of
scrutiny is ongoing. It makes sense given the information gap
because employees have not had the wherewithal to police such
terms themselves. Moreover, standard requirements for arbitration
agreements would reduce the information necessary to evaluate each
agreement; employees would know that the agreement would at
least have to adhere to a certain level of fairness. A second direction,
however, would be to require that more information be generated
about the arbitral process. Requiring published arbitral opinions, for
example, would allow employees greater access to information about
the quality of the arbitral forum. The “win rates” for employers and
employees for a particular arbitrator might also be useful
information in evaluating potential bias.191 Perhaps employers might
be required to provide a copy of arbitration rules and procedures or
their own success rates in arbitration. Information about claims filed
against the employer would provide employees with a sense of the
risk they have of needing to file such a claim. As more information
becomes available to employees, employers, and the counsel who
work with them, the parties will have a better sense of the costs and
that unconscionability be used to prevent purveyors of adhesive contracts
from taking advantage of the market failure inherent in certain contracts
relating to the “salience” of a particular contract term. He argues that
buyers make their purchases based on a calculation of the salient costs and
benefits of the decision, but fail to account for non-salient terms. Thus,
sellers have an incentive to make non-salient terms inefficiently favorable to
themselves. Id. at 1243-44. This approach has applications in the
employment law context.
Employees, like buyers, will make their
employment choice based on the salient features of the job, such as salary,
health benefits, job duties, and possibilities for promotion. The issue of
employment arbitration is likely to be non-salient, thus giving employers an
opportunity to make such agreements inefficiently favorable. Cf. id. at 1234
(discussing the non-salience of arbitration provisions in consumer
agreements).
191 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RIGHTS & EMP. POL. J. 189, 216-17 (1997) (discussing the potential for
disclosure concerning arbitrator bias).
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benefits of arbitration and the wisdom of agreeing to arbitrate
employment claims.
There are dangers to both mandatory procedures and greater
disclosure. Arbitration is attractive in part due to its flexibility and
adaptability to particular environments. Mandatory terms would
restrict the parties’ ability to develop a system of arbitration tailored
to their needs. Similarly, greater disclosure would entail higher
arbitral costs, as arbitrators and employers would need to develop
and publish this information. However, when balanced against the
costs of unfair arbitration agreements, these choices may be the best
available alternative. Ultimately, we can hope that employers and
employees will be able to engage in meaningful negotiations over
arbitration agreements that are societally efficient and benefit both
parties. But we are not there yet.

CONCLUSION
If the ideology behind law and economics is about freeing
people to make rational decisions about their own utility, then it
would be in line with this ideology – perhaps counterintuitively – to
hold pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements unenforceable.
As I believe the foregoing models have demonstrated, employees are
in a much better position to judge the efficiency of arbitration and
litigation after a dispute has arisen. Locking employees in ahead of
time restrains their ability to make informed decisions. To justify
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, there has to be a reason for
employees to be locked in. Merely showing that arbitration in and of
itself is cheap and fair does not explain why parties cannot choose it
after the dispute has arisen.
There is a story to tell, however, about how pre-dispute
arbitration agreements may end up increasing societal efficiency. By
shuttling parties into a (theoretically) quicker and cheaper form of
dispute resolution, society may save money on judicial
administration and litigation costs. Requiring the parties to pay for
their own dispute resolution provides them with an incentive to keep
costs down. And if we expect employers to pick up the bulk of this
sum, as some courts have suggested, then allowing employers to lock
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all of their employees into a pre-dispute arbitration system might be
the only way for employers to recoup the costs of creating the
system. It would be up to courts to require a combination of
mandatory procedures and mandatory disclosure that would allow
employers and employees to make informed, efficient decisions
about such agreements. Ultimately, further research and debate will
reveal the wisdom of these possible paths.

